Mirian E. Menjivar Sanchez v. Minga Wofford, Warden, Mesa Verde Immigrant Processing Center; Nancy Gonzalez, Acting Director of Bakersfield, CA Field Office, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement; Kristi Noem, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and Pamela Bondi, Attorney General of the United States

Summary

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California converts a previously issued temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction in an immigration detainee's habeas action. The court holds that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) does not apply to the petitioner, who entered the United States approximately twenty years earlier and was detained under § 1226(a), and grants injunctive relief concerning her release and detention conditions.

Holdings

1. Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to a noncitizen who entered the United States twenty years earlier, is already residing in the country, and is not actively seeking admission or lawful entry.
2. Petitioner was likely detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), and was therefore wrongfully denied the discretionary bond process initially granted by the immigration judge.
3. Petitioner satisfied the requirements for preliminary injunctive relief because she demonstrated likely success or, at minimum, serious questions on the statutory detention issue, irreparable medical and liberty-related harm, favorable equities, and a public interest in preventing unlawful detention and preserving family unity.
4. The Government was required to remove the electronic ankle monitor and could not impose additional release restrictions unless such restrictions were determined necessary at a later custody hearing.

Questions Presented

1. Whether petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) merely because she was present in the United States without having been admitted, despite having entered twenty years earlier and not actively seeking admission.
2. Whether petitioner was likely to succeed on her claim that detention was governed by the discretionary detention and bond-hearing framework of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
3. Whether petitioner satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunction.
4. Whether the Government could impose electronic monitoring and additional release restrictions that had not been ordered by the immigration judge or the court.
5. What procedural protections were required before petitioner could be re-arrested or re-detained.

Disposition

other