Taylor v. Ingram

Summary

These Findings and Recommendations address defendant Marsha Ingram’s motion for summary judgment in Kenneth Lee Taylor’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First Amendment retaliation action. The court recommends granting the motion as to claims based on a Counseling Only Rules Violation Report and housing reassignment, but denying it as to the alleged threat to reassign Taylor’s housing. The document also discusses evidentiary issues, including untimely responses to requests for admission and treatment of a verified pro se complaint as opposing evidence.

Holdings

1. A counseling-only rules violation report that is informational, results in no formal discipline, and is not shown to have caused a separate concrete harm does not constitute an adverse action for purposes of a prisoner's First Amendment retaliation claim.
2. Taylor failed to establish a triable issue that Ingram personally participated in, directed, or set in motion the housing reassignment, so the retaliation claim based on the completed reassignment fails under § 1983.
3. A threat to transfer a prisoner may constitute an adverse action even if the threatened transfer is never carried out. Because the parties disputed whether Ingram made the threat and the record permitted an inference that a reasonable prisoner would view it as detrimental, summary judgment was improper on this claim.
4. Qualified immunity did not warrant summary judgment on the alleged retaliatory-threat claim because the disputed facts could establish a First Amendment violation and the prohibition against retaliatory threats of transfer was clearly established in the Ninth Circuit.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the counseling-only rules violation report constituted an adverse action supporting a First Amendment retaliation claim.
2. Whether Taylor presented sufficient evidence that Ingram personally participated in or caused the allegedly retaliatory housing reassignment.
3. Whether Ingram's alleged threat to reassign Taylor's housing constituted an adverse action and created a triable First Amendment retaliation claim.
4. Whether Ingram was entitled to qualified immunity on the alleged retaliatory-threat claim.

Disposition

other