Dustin Canfield and Darrik Gregg v. Grant County Sheriff's Office, a Division of Grant County; and Grant County, a legal organized county existing under the laws of the State of Washington; Tom Jones, individually; and Ryan Rectenwald, individually

Summary

The document is an order addressing Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and Plaintiffs’ motion to supplement authorities in an employment-related civil rights action. The court grants the motion to supplement in part and grants summary judgment in part, concluding that Dustin Canfield presented sufficient factual disputes regarding protected speech, adverse employment action, and causation, while Darrik Gregg did not establish sufficient facts to proceed on his First Amendment retaliation claim. The opinion also addresses compelled speech or silence and municipal liability under Monell.

Holdings

1. The motion to supplement was granted in part because the parties had agreed to stipulate to the authorities, but the court refused to permit an additional paragraph that presented new argument rather than authorities.
2. Summary judgment was denied because Canfield presented genuine disputes concerning whether he spoke as a private citizen, whether defendants took adverse employment action, and whether his speech substantially motivated the alleged retaliatory conduct.
3. Summary judgment was granted on Gregg's First Amendment claim because he did not establish a genuine dispute that he spoke as a private citizen or that he suffered an adverse employment action.
4. Canfield could not base his § 1983 First Amendment claim on compelled speech or silence because plaintiffs did not show a required message or silence, a predetermined penalty for noncompliance, or clearly established law placing the alleged conduct beyond debate.
5. Summary judgment was granted to Grant County on the § 1983 claim because plaintiffs did not present evidence of deliberate municipal action, a policy or custom causing the constitutional injury, or a basis for liability beyond the conduct of individual employees.
6. Summary judgment was denied on qualified immunity because Canfield presented evidence supporting a First Amendment violation and identified sufficiently relevant, preexisting precedent to create a factual dispute concerning whether the right was clearly established in 2021.
7. Summary judgment was denied on plaintiffs' wrongful-discharge claims because the evidence created a factual dispute about whether the alleged retaliation for reporting misconduct was a significant factor in the resignations and whether the working conditions were intolerable.
8. Canfield could not rely on constructive discharge as an adverse employment action for his § 1983 claim because the alleged conditions did not meet the heightened standard requiring extraordinary and egregious deterioration of working conditions.
9. Summary judgment was granted on plaintiffs' IIED claim because the alleged conduct was not sufficiently extreme and outrageous, and plaintiffs did not present evidence from which reasonable minds could differ concerning intent or severe emotional distress.

Questions Presented

1. Whether plaintiffs presented a genuine dispute of material fact on their First Amendment retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2. Whether Canfield's speech was made as a private citizen rather than pursuant to his official duties.
3. Whether Gregg's speech was protected speech and whether he suffered an adverse employment action.
4. Whether plaintiffs established a basis for municipal liability under Monell.
5. Whether qualified immunity barred Canfield's individual-officer First Amendment claim.
6. Whether plaintiffs' resignations and alleged workplace conditions supported wrongful discharge in violation of Washington public policy and constructive discharge.
7. Whether plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct, intent, and severe emotional distress to maintain an IIED claim.
8. Whether plaintiffs should be permitted to supplement their authorities.

Disposition

other