Raymond J. Bergeron Davila v. Sarah A. Boyea, et al.

Summary

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin grants Raymond J. Bergeron Davila leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and screens his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The court permits Eighth Amendment medical-care and excessive-force claims to proceed against several prison officials, dismisses certain Doe defendants for lack of personal involvement, and orders service and payment of the remaining filing fee.

Holdings

1. The complaint plausibly alleged that the plaintiff had an objectively serious arm injury and that VandenBush was deliberately indifferent by failing to provide treatment or refer him for treatment; the claim may proceed.
2. The complaint plausibly alleged Eighth Amendment medical-care claims against Van Lanen, Boyea, Stevens, and Schultz based on placing or authorizing the plaintiff's placement in a restraint bed for hours instead of treating his injured arm.
3. The plaintiff may proceed against Boyea, Stevens, and Schultz for allegedly ordering removal of the metal or continued restraint, and against Howath for the manner in which he removed the metal from the plaintiff's arm.
4. The plaintiff may proceed on an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim against Race, Van Lanen, and Does 5-10 based on allegations that they unnecessarily forced his injured arm to straighten during handcuffing and caused severe pain.
5. The claims against ACP Does 1-2 and Does 2-4 were dismissed because the complaint did not allege that those defendants personally participated in the asserted constitutional deprivations.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the complaint plausibly alleged Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claims based on the alleged denial or delay of treatment for the plaintiff's injured arm.
2. Whether the complaint plausibly alleged Eighth Amendment claims against officials who allegedly placed or kept the plaintiff in a restraint bed despite knowledge that it aggravated his injury.
3. Whether the complaint plausibly alleged an Eighth Amendment claim based on Lieutenant Howath's alleged forced removal of metal from the plaintiff's arm.
4. Whether the complaint plausibly alleged an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim based on officers' use of rear handcuffing during the escort to the medical unit.
5. Whether the complaint stated claims against ACP Does 1-2 and Does 2-4 despite not alleging their personal involvement.

Disposition

other