Preston Nelson v. Darrel Vannoy, Warden

Summary

This Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation addresses Preston Nelson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The report analyzes procedural default, exhaustion, sufficiency of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and related constitutional claims, and recommends that the petition be denied. An evidentiary hearing was conducted only on a claim concerning trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecution’s opening statement.

Holdings

1. Claims that were not fairly presented to Louisiana's highest court and would now be barred by Louisiana's successive-application or limitations rules are technically exhausted and procedurally defaulted; the federal court may not review them absent cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
2. Under Jackson v. Virginia and AEDPA, habeas relief was unwarranted because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational factfinder could find Nelson guilty as a principal to second-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder, including the required specific intent.
3. Appellate counsel was not ineffective for declining to raise a meritless or comparatively weaker sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument.
4. The trial court did not violate Nelson's qualified right to counsel of choice by denying his mid-trial request to substitute retained counsel and counsel's motion to withdraw.
5. Nelson knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his constitutional right to testify; dissatisfaction and distrust of counsel did not invalidate the waiver.
6. Counsel's alleged failures to cross-examine Jarvis more forcefully did not constitute a complete failure to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, so prejudice could not be presumed under United States v. Cronic.
7. The prosecutor's isolated and inaccurate opening-statement reference to an alleged confession did not so infect the trial with unfairness as to violate due process.
8. Nelson's challenge to the sufficiency of the state indictment was not cognizable on federal habeas review because the indictment was not shown to be so defective that the state trial court lacked jurisdiction.
9. Trial counsel was not ineffective under Strickland for failing to object to the prosecutor's inaccurate opening-statement assertion that Robin Johnson would testify that Nelson and Baker confessed to the Kingfisher murders.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Claims 6(C), 7(B), 8, and 10 were unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.
2. Whether the evidence was constitutionally sufficient to support Nelson's convictions for the Elmgrove murder and attempted murder, including the specific-intent element.
3. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge.
4. Whether the trial court violated Nelson's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice by denying his mid-trial request to discharge retained counsel and counsel's request to withdraw.
5. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the alleged counsel-of-choice violation.
6. Whether Nelson knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to testify.
7. Whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective under the meaningful-adversarial-testing standard for failing to cross-examine Jarvis more extensively.
8. Whether the prosecutor's opening-statement reference to an alleged confession deprived Nelson of due process.
9. Whether Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 465 rendered the indictment constitutionally defective.
10. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's inaccurate opening-statement reference to an inculpatory statement by Nelson.

Disposition

dismissed