Johnathon Douglas, #448602, et al. v. Damon Hinninger, et al.

Summary

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee screened the plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The court allowed Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims to proceed against Justin Cunningham and Elisha Futrel, dismissed the claims against the other named defendants, and denied Johnathon Douglas’s motion to appoint counsel without prejudice. The action was referred to the magistrate judge for further pretrial proceedings.

Holdings

1. The complaint stated viable Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims against STG Coordinator Justin Cunningham and Captain Elisha Futrel because the allegations supported an inference that they knew of the first attack, had authority to move plaintiffs, and nevertheless allowed them to return to the housing unit where the second attack occurred.
2. The complaint failed to state viable Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims against the defendants other than Cunningham and Futrel because it did not plausibly allege that they were subjectively aware of plaintiffs' safety concerns before the second October 15 attack or that plaintiffs suffered a later attack.
3. The complaint failed to state a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim because plaintiffs did not allege that their disciplinary proceedings imposed an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
4. Douglas's motion to appoint counsel was denied without prejudice because there is generally no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a civil action and he did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances warranting discretionary appointment.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the Second Amended Complaint stated Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims against prison officials.
2. Whether the alleged disciplinary proceedings deprived plaintiffs of a protected liberty interest without procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
3. Whether Douglas was entitled to appointment of counsel in this civil action.

Disposition

other