Antoinette McCrary v. Truist Bank, et al.

Summary

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama granted defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion in Antoinette McCrary’s foreclosure-related action against Truist Bank and its attorneys. The court rejected the plaintiff’s theories concerning lack of standing to foreclose, the need to produce an original “wet-ink” note, and claims under various federal and Alabama statutes. All claims were dismissed with prejudice, the plaintiff’s sanctions motion was denied as moot, and the case was closed.

Holdings

1. No. Alabama permits a foreclosure by an entity holding a mortgage containing a power of sale, and the theory that the foreclosing party must produce the original wet-ink note is frivolous. The plaintiff therefore failed to state claims based on that theory for wrongful foreclosure, quiet title, or injunctive relief.
2. No. The Administrative Procedure Act applies to federal agencies and does not provide a cause of action against a private bank; private individuals cannot enforce federal criminal statutes through civil actions; 18 U.S.C. §§ 912 and 1001 do not create private rights of action; and the complaint did not allege state action sufficient for a § 1983 claim.
3. No. A mortgage company enforcing a security interest through foreclosure is outside the FDCPA's ambit on the allegations presented, and the complaint did not plausibly allege that the defendant attorneys were engaged in actionable debt collection.
4. No. TILA does not permit rescission of the residential mortgage transaction alleged here, and RESPA requires a servicer to respond only to qualified written requests seeking information relating to loan servicing. The plaintiff's requests for loan validation, payoff information, origination-chain information, and enforcement authority did not state a viable claim, and the remaining allegations were conclusory.
5. No. The complaint did not allege facts showing a conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities, a conspiracy to injure her for enforcing legal rights, furtherance of the conspiracy, or injury caused by it.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the amended complaint stated claims for declaratory, injunctive, wrongful-foreclosure, slander-of-title, or quiet-title relief based on the assertion that defendants lacked standing to foreclose without possessing the original wet-ink promissory note.
2. Whether the amended complaint stated claims for unauthorized disclosure of private information, false statements, federal impersonation, or due-process violations under the cited federal statutes.
3. Whether the complaint stated a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act against a mortgage company and attorneys involved in foreclosure proceedings.
4. Whether the complaint stated claims under the Truth in Lending Act or the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act based on a purported rescission notice and qualified written request.
5. Whether the complaint stated a civil-conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) or § 1985(3).

Disposition

dismissed