Rodney Wayne Patterson v. Warden Dewayne Estes

Summary

This memorandum opinion addresses Rodney Wayne Patterson’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition challenging his Alabama attempted-murder conviction. The court considers whether Patterson’s speedy-trial and ineffective-assistance claims were exhausted or procedurally defaulted, recounting the relevant state-court proceedings and applying federal habeas principles.

Holdings

1. Patterson exhausted his speedy-trial claim by presenting it through one complete round of Alabama appellate review, but he was not entitled to federal habeas relief because the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reasonably applied Barker v. Wingo and reasonably determined that the delay was not attributable to intentional or negligent state conduct, that Patterson asserted the right only two days before trial, and that he failed to establish actual prejudice.
2. The ineffective-assistance claim was procedurally defaulted, and Patterson failed to demonstrate actual prejudice sufficient to excuse the default, even assuming that post-conviction counsel's abandonment could constitute cause.
3. The remaining claims were forfeited because Patterson did not address them in his counseled brief; to the extent they alleged state-law errors, they were not cognizable in federal habeas; and to the extent they were unexhausted, they were procedurally defaulted without a showing of actual prejudice.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Patterson's Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claim was exhausted and, under AEDPA, warranted federal habeas relief.
2. Whether Patterson's ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim based on counsel's failure to assert a speedy-trial challenge earlier was procedurally defaulted and, if so, whether abandonment by post-conviction counsel established cause and actual prejudice.
3. Whether Patterson's other pro se habeas claims were forfeited, noncognizable because they alleged state-law errors, or procedurally defaulted.

Disposition

dismissed