Summary
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the City and County of San Francisco’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and its alternative motion for a new trial or remittitur following a jury verdict for Cecil H. Moss on California disability-discrimination claims. The court held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s findings that the City failed to provide reasonable accommodation and failed to engage in a good-faith interactive process. The court also granted in part and denied in part Moss’s motion to amend the judgment, including to correct a calculation error and award post-judgment interest.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Moss's FEHA failure-to-accommodate claim.
- Whether the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Moss's FEHA failure-to-engage-in-the-interactive-process claim.
- Whether the jury's verdicts were against the clear weight of the evidence so as to warrant a new trial.
- Whether alleged limits on Moss's testimony and the exclusion of impeachment evidence substantially prejudiced the City.
- Whether admission of medical-restriction evidence warranted a new trial.
- Whether the lost-wage award required a new trial or remittitur based on mitigation or excessiveness.
- Whether the judgment should be amended to correct the lost-wage calculation and award prejudgment and post-judgment interest.
Holdings
- The City was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that Moss met the minimum qualifications for, and could perform the essential functions of, the School Crossing Guard position. The City also improperly attempted to raise a new minimum-qualifications argument in its Rule 50(b) motion.
- The City was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the interactive-process claim because its argument that Moss caused the breakdown was not raised in its Rule 50(a) motion, and substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that the City failed to participate in a timely, good-faith interactive process.
- The City was not entitled to a new trial or remittitur because it failed to show that the verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence, that the evidentiary rulings caused substantial prejudice, or that the damages award was unsupported or excessive.
- The judgment was properly amended to reduce the lost-wage award from $255,116 to $250,616 because the parties did not dispute that the original figure included an extra month of wages.
- Moss was not entitled to prejudgment interest under California Civil Code section 3287(a) because the amount of damages depended on disputed facts concerning which alternate position he was qualified to perform.
- The judgment was properly amended to award post-judgment interest from January 28, 2025, at the statutory rate, calculated by the court as $28.77 per day.
Key quotations
“A Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law is proper when “the evidence permits only one conclusion and that conclusion is contrary to the jury’s verdict.”” (at 3)
“The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” (at 3)
“A “jury’s verdict must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence, which is evidence adequate to support the jury’s conclusion, even if it is possible to draw a contrary conclusion.”” (at 3)
“Because it is a renewed motion, a proper post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion is limited to the grounds asserted in the pre-deliberation Rule 50(a) motion.” (at 3)
“Upon the Rule 59 motion of the party against whom a verdict has been returned, the district court has the duty to weigh the evidence as the court saw it, and to set aside the verdict of the jury, even though supported by substantial evidence, where, in the court’s conscientious opinion, the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.” (at 8)
“If the court, “after viewing the evidence concerning damages in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, determines that the damages award is excessive, it has two alternatives”: “[i]t may grant defendant’s motion for a new trial or deny the motion conditional upon the prevailing party accepting a remittitur.”” (at 10)
“As the “shall” in the statute indicates, “postjudgment interest on a district court judgment is mandatory.”” (at 19)
Factual background
Moss, a City employee with a physical disability, sought reasonable accommodation after a medical separation from his prior position. The evidence included potential alternate City positions, including an 8201 School Crossing Guard position, for which a City reasonable-accommodation coordinator testified Moss met the minimum qualifications. The jury found that the City failed to accommodate Moss and failed to participate in a timely, good-faith interactive process, awarding lost wages based on the School Crossing Guard position.
Procedural history
Moss sued the City alleging failure to provide reasonable accommodation and failure to engage in a good-faith interactive process under FEHA. Following a five-day trial, the jury found for Moss on both claims and awarded $255,116 in lost wages. The court entered judgment on January 28, 2025, denied the City's post-trial motions, reduced the damages award by $4,500 to correct an undisputed calculation error, denied prejudgment interest, and awarded post-judgment interest.