Greenlaw v. Micone

Summary

This is an order from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California resolving the parties’ motions in limine in a Rehabilitation Act employment-discrimination case. The court grants, denies, or defers rulings on evidentiary issues involving prior conviction and disbarment, other litigation, employment declarations, late discovery, damages calculations, medical letters, post-termination employment, and related emails. The order states that the sole claim for trial concerns whether OSHA terminated Ms. Greenlaw because of her disability.

Holdings

1. A felony conviction more than ten years old was excluded because its probative value concerning credibility did not substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(b)(1).
2. Evidence of Greenlaw's law degree and disbarment was excluded as irrelevant, and the disbarment was additionally excluded because its probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
3. Evidence of Greenlaw's other claims or complaints could not be offered to show that she had a propensity to sue or complain, and unsuccessful claims asserted in the present action could not be used for that purpose. The court deferred ruling on factual testimony or interrogatory answers offered to explain why Greenlaw believed her employment was terminated.
4. Greenlaw could be cross-examined about whether she truthfully represented her probation and prior termination history in federal employment declarations. The Secretary could not introduce extrinsic evidence of her probation status to prove specific conduct under Rule 608(b), but could use Greenlaw's own prior inconsistent statements under Rule 613 if she denied being on probation.
5. When a party fails to disclose information required by Rule 26, Rule 37(c)(1) generally bars use of that information at trial unless the failure was substantially justified or harmless. Applying that principle, the court excluded one late-produced dog photograph, allowed Exhibit 85, denied the motion as to unidentified supplemental interrogatory information, and deferred ruling on the purported government pay-scale exhibits.
6. The Dr. Alsan letter was admissible for the non-hearsay purpose of showing that Greenlaw submitted it in support of an accommodation request and that OSHA reviewed it and acted on the request, but it was inadmissible to prove the truth of the medical diagnosis or conclusion stated in the letter.
7. Greenlaw could testify about post-termination federal employment, including its duties and responsibilities, but could not speculate about why other employers hired her or permitted her to perform particular work.
8. Greenlaw could testify about her own symptoms, impairments, workplace limitations, and understanding of her condition, diagnoses, and treatment, but could not testify to hearsay concerning what her doctors said or to her doctors' opinions about her impairments and limitations.

Questions Presented

1. Whether evidence of Greenlaw's more-than-ten-year-old felony conviction and related disbarment was admissible for impeachment or another purpose.
2. Whether evidence of Greenlaw's other litigation, withdrawn claims, union-related activities, and unsuccessful theories could be used to suggest litigiousness, general lack of credibility, or absence of disability discrimination.
3. Whether Greenlaw could be cross-examined about statements in federal employment declarations concerning probation and prior termination, and whether extrinsic evidence could be used to prove those matters.
4. Whether late-produced discovery materials and damages evidence concerning other employment opportunities, federal salaries, and benefits should be excluded.
5. Whether medical letters and testimony concerning medical providers' statements were admissible as evidence of disability or for a non-hearsay purpose.
6. Whether Greenlaw could present evidence of post-termination federal employment and testimony about her own symptoms and impairments.
7. Whether emails concerning Greenlaw's dog and reasonable accommodation could be admitted through witnesses who participated in the communications.

Disposition

other