Mark Mortensen v. Dwight Arrowood, et al.

Summary

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois grants the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in Mark Mortensen’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. The court concludes that the K9 deployment and approximately 20-to-21-second bite were objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, that the other officers had no reasonable opportunity to intervene, and that the Monell claim therefore fails.

Holdings

1. Deputy Arrowood's deployment of the K9 was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because Mortensen was wanted for a serious crime, was actively fleeing from multiple police vehicles, and posed an immediate danger to officers and the public by running through traffic.
2. The continued K9 bite for approximately 20 to 21 seconds was not objectively unreasonable because the incident occurred rapidly, Mortensen had been actively fleeing until apprehended, and the K9 released before he was handcuffed.
3. Deputy Arrowood was entitled to qualified immunity because the undisputed facts did not establish a constitutional violation and the conduct was materially more like the conduct found reasonable in Johnson than the conduct found unreasonable in Becker.
4. The other officers were entitled to summary judgment on the failure-to-intervene claim because no underlying excessive-force violation occurred.
5. The Lake County Sheriff could not be liable under Monell because the undisputed facts established no underlying constitutional violation.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Deputy Arrowood's initial deployment of the K9 against Mortensen constituted excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.
2. Whether Deputy Arrowood's allowing the K9 to bite Mortensen for approximately 20 to 21 seconds after Mortensen was knocked to the ground and yelled that he was down constituted excessive force.
3. Whether Deputy Arrowood was entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive-force claims.
4. Whether the other officers failed to intervene despite having reason to know excessive force was being used and a realistic opportunity to intervene.
5. Whether the Lake County Sheriff could be liable under Monell for inadequate training, supervision, or control when there was no underlying constitutional violation.

Disposition

other