Marwan Zayed v. Village of Lisle

Summary

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois grants in part the Village of Lisle’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion in Marwan Zayed’s action alleging discriminatory denial of a business development grant and unequal treatment. The court dismisses Counts I, III, IV, and V with prejudice as time-barred or improperly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, declines supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining Illinois constitutional claim, and remands the case to state court.

Holdings

1. A plaintiff may not sue a state actor directly under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; § 1983 provides the exclusive remedy for alleged § 1981 violations by state actors. Count III was therefore dismissed with prejudice because Zayed had already pleaded a § 1983 claim and amendment would be futile.
2. Zayed's Illinois Civil Rights Act, § 1983, and Title VI claims were untimely because each accrued no later than December 8, 2022, when the Village denied his grant application, and he did not file suit until June 13, 2025.
3. Administrative-exhaustion tolling, equitable tolling, the discovery rule, the continuing-violation doctrine, equitable estoppel, and Rule 15(c) relation back did not save Counts I, IV, and V from the limitations bar.
4. After dismissing all claims within its original federal-question jurisdiction, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count II under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) and remanded that claim to state court.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Zayed could bring a direct claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against the Village, a state actor, when he also pleaded a claim under § 1983.
2. Whether Zayed's Illinois Civil Rights Act, § 1983, and Title VI claims were barred by the applicable two-year statutes of limitations.
3. Whether administrative-exhaustion tolling, equitable tolling, the discovery rule, the continuing-violation doctrine, equitable estoppel, or relation back under Rule 15(c) avoided the limitations bar.
4. Whether the court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Zayed's remaining claim under Article I, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution after dismissing the claims within its original federal-question jurisdiction.

Disposition

remanded