Zoe Marsh-Leigh v. David Moore, et al.

Summary

The court grants Zoe Marsh-Leigh leave to file a second amended complaint but dismisses Michael Young-Bey's claims for improper joinder. The opinion addresses First Amendment viewpoint-discrimination and retaliation claims, Fourteenth Amendment due-process and equal-protection claims, and alleged municipal liability arising from access to and speech at Chicago City Council meetings. Some of Marsh-Leigh's claims survive, while others are dismissed for failure to state a claim or because they are barred by her guilty plea or lack sufficient allegations of personal involvement.

Holdings

1. Leave to file the second amended complaint was granted because the proposed amendment was not futile and there was no undue delay, unfair prejudice, or bad faith.
2. Young-Bey's claims could not be joined with Marsh-Leigh's claims because they arose from distinct events involving largely different defendants and lacked the required transaction-or-occurrence relationship.
3. The proposed First Amendment claim based on Moore's blocking Marsh-Leigh from his Facebook account was dismissed because the complaint did not plausibly allege state action.
4. The claims concerning denial of public-comment access on November 14, 2023 and the January 2025 three-month attendance ban plausibly stated First Amendment claims and could proceed, while the claim concerning removal from the November 2023 meeting was dismissed.
5. Marsh-Leigh plausibly alleged First Amendment retaliation based on denial of speaking time on November 14, 2023 and the January 2025 three-month ban, and those portions of the retaliation claim could proceed.
6. Marsh-Leigh failed to state a procedural due process claim based on the January 2025 exclusion because she failed to pursue adequate post-deprivation remedies under the Illinois Open Meetings Act.
7. The City-defendants' class-of-one equal protection claim could proceed insofar as it challenged the January 2025 three-month exclusion, but claims based on the November 2023 exclusion and other deprivations were dismissed. The equal protection claim against Preckwinkle was dismissed.
8. Marsh-Leigh plausibly alleged a Monell claim against the City based on the January 2025 exclusion because she alleged that Harris acted as a final policymaker for Council security and meeting access and directed or ratified the ban.
9. Qualified immunity did not warrant dismissal of the remaining individual-defendant claims at the pleading stage.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Marsh-Leigh should be granted leave to file a second amended complaint.
2. Whether Young-Bey's claims were properly joined with Marsh-Leigh's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20.
3. Whether the proposed allegations stated viable First Amendment viewpoint-discrimination and retaliation claims.
4. Whether Marsh-Leigh stated a procedural due process claim based on her three-month exclusion from City Council meetings.
5. Whether Marsh-Leigh stated class-of-one equal protection claims against the City defendants and Preckwinkle.
6. Whether the proposed allegations plausibly supported municipal liability under Monell.
7. Whether qualified immunity warranted dismissal at the pleading stage.

Disposition

other