Carlos Mejia Diaz v. Kristi Noem, Samuel Olson, Pamela Bondi, US Department of Homeland Security, Executive Office for Immigration Review, and Warden

Summary

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana considers Carlos Mejia Diaz’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition challenging his mandatory immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). The court rejects jurisdictional and exhaustion arguments, concluding that the petition is not barred by the Immigration and Nationality Act and that exhaustion would be futile. It holds that § 1225(b)(2) does not authorize mandatory detention of a noncitizen apprehended in the interior years after unlawful entry, and addresses the potential applicability of detention authority under § 1226(a).

Holdings

1. Section 1252(e)(3) did not deprive the Northern District of Indiana of jurisdiction because Mejia Diaz presented an individualized challenge to whether § 1225(b)(2) applied to him, not a facial or systemic challenge to the expedited-removal system or a particular written policy.
2. Section 1252(g) did not bar the petition because a challenge to the legality of detention is distinct from a challenge to the decision to commence removal proceedings, adjudicate a case, or execute a removal order.
3. Section 1252(b)(9) did not preclude habeas jurisdiction because the legal question whether Mejia Diaz was properly classified for detention under § 1225(b)(2) did not arise from an action taken to remove him from the United States.
4. Exhaustion was not required because Congress had not expressly mandated it for a § 2241 petition challenging detention, and exhaustion would have been futile in light of the agency's predetermined position.
5. Section 1225(b)(2)'s mandatory-detention provision does not apply to a noncitizen who entered without inspection, has lived in the United States for years, and was apprehended in the interior rather than while presently seeking admission at the border.
6. The government lacked a statutory basis to continue detaining Mejia Diaz because his prior conditional parole had not been revoked by an official authorized to revoke it.

Questions Presented

1. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3) vested exclusive jurisdiction in the District Court for the District of Columbia over Mejia Diaz's individualized challenge to his classification for detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
2. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) barred habeas review of the legality of Mejia Diaz's detention.
3. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) required the detention challenge to be brought only through judicial review of a final removal order.
4. Whether exhaustion of administrative remedies was required before Mejia Diaz could pursue his § 2241 detention challenge.
5. Whether § 1225(b)(2)'s mandatory-detention provision applies to a noncitizen who entered without inspection, has lived in the United States for years, and was apprehended in the interior rather than while seeking admission at the border.
6. Whether the government had a statutory basis to continue detaining Mejia Diaz after his prior conditional parole had not been revoked by an authorized official.

Disposition

writ_granted