Marin v. De La Torre, et al.

Summary

The United States District Court for the Southern District of California granted Mel Marin’s motions to proceed in forma pauperis, denied his motion to withdraw reference in related bankruptcy proceedings, and dismissed with prejudice his complaints against defendants in Marin v. Frazier and Marin v. De La Torre. The court concluded that the claims were conclusory, failed to overcome judicial immunity and other pleading deficiencies, and did not adequately allege violations of the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, or First and Fourteenth Amendments.

Holdings

1. The plaintiff's in forma pauperis applications were sufficient because he alleged income and expenses showing that he could not pay court costs while affording life's necessities.
2. Withdrawal of reference was not warranted because the plaintiff did not identify a non-title 11 statute or significant unresolved non-title 11 issue requiring withdrawal, and his attempt to overturn state and federal court decisions through the bankruptcy proceeding had no legal basis.
3. The complaints were subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because they were frivolous, conclusory, failed to state claims, or sought relief barred by immunity and jurisdictional principles.
4. The claims against Judge Frazier were barred by absolute judicial immunity because the alleged conduct was undertaken within the scope of his judicial authority.
5. The ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims failed because the plaintiff did not plead his disability, requested accommodation, relevant classes or standards, or facts showing discrimination based on disability or deliberate indifference.
6. The First Amendment retaliation claim failed because the plaintiff did not plausibly allege that defendants' adverse action was motivated by his exercise of a constitutionally protected right.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the plaintiff satisfied the requirements for proceeding in forma pauperis.
2. Whether withdrawal of reference from the bankruptcy proceedings was mandatory or permissive under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d).
3. Whether the complaints stated claims sufficient to survive screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
4. Whether claims against a state judge were barred by absolute judicial immunity and restrictions on federal review of state-court judgments.
5. Whether the complaint stated ADA, Rehabilitation Act, First Amendment retaliation, or Fourteenth Amendment claims.

Disposition

dismissed