Christopher Ayash v. David Barnette and Karl Hamm

Summary

This Memorandum Opinion and Order addresses cross-motions for summary judgment in a dispute over the interpretation and administration of the Patricia Louise Ayash Living Trust. The court grants the plaintiff’s motion to strike the defendants’ trust-administration expert because the opinions offer inadmissible legal conclusions. The court also concludes that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claims and on their declaratory judgment claim, while denying the defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees and costs.

Holdings

1. Paragraph 6.2(a)'s provision for outright distribution at age fifty-five applied at the time of the grantor's death. Because Ayash had not reached fifty-five when the grantor died, his share was placed in the separate Non-GST-Exempt Trust governed by Paragraph 6.2(c), rather than becoming automatically distributable when he later reached age fifty-five.
2. The plaintiff could not assert at the summary-judgment stage a new breach-of-trust theory based on alleged abuse of the trustees' discretion under Paragraph 6.2(c)(v), because that theory materially altered the factual basis of the breach claim pleaded in the complaint.
3. The trustees did not breach the Trust Agreement or any fiduciary duty by refusing to distribute Ayash's share at age fifty-five because Paragraph 6.2(a) did not entitle him to that distribution.
4. The trustees were not entitled to attorney fees and costs under West Virginia Code § 44D-10-1004 because an award was not required by justice and equity under the circumstances.
5. The opinions of defendants' expert Christopher Winton were inadmissible legal conclusions because they interpreted the Trust Agreement, applied that interpretation and governing law to the facts, and opined on whether the trustees breached their duties.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Paragraph 6.2(a) of the Trust Agreement required the trustees to distribute Ayash's trust share outright when he reached age fifty-five.
2. Whether Ayash's trust share was governed instead by Paragraph 6.2(c), including its discretionary withdrawal provisions and termination terms.
3. Whether the plaintiff could assert at summary judgment a breach-of-trust theory based on the trustees' exercise of discretion under Paragraph 6.2(c)(v) when that theory was not pleaded in the complaint.
4. Whether the trustees breached the Trust Agreement or their fiduciary duties by refusing to distribute Ayash's share under Paragraph 6.2(a).
5. Whether the trustees were entitled to attorney fees and costs under West Virginia Code § 44D-10-1004.

Disposition

other