Anthony Scott Coleman v. Chris Kendall, et al.

Summary

The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied defendants’ motions for summary judgment in an excessive-force action arising from a traffic stop and police K-9 deployment. The court found genuine disputes of material fact concerning the plaintiff’s resistance, the force used by the officers, qualified immunity, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the City of Dunbar’s potential Monell liability. The court held that these disputes must be resolved by a jury.

Holdings

1. Summary judgment was improper because genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding Plaintiff's level of resistance, the threat he posed, and the nature, necessity, and proportionality of the force used.
2. The Officer Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity at the summary-judgment stage because the constitutional-violation question depended on disputed facts, and the right of a non-threatening, unarmed, passively resisting suspect to be free from unnecessary, gratuitous, and disproportionate force, including police-dog deployment, was clearly established.
3. Summary judgment was improper on Plaintiff's intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim because, viewing Plaintiff's evidence favorably, a reasonable jury could find the officers' conduct extreme and outrageous and could determine whether the remaining elements were satisfied.
4. Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create genuine disputes for trial on municipal liability based on failure to train and persistent practice theories.

Questions Presented

1. Whether genuine disputes of material fact concerning Plaintiff's resistance and the force used precluded summary judgment on the excessive-force and qualified-immunity claims.
2. Whether the alleged conduct could satisfy the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress under West Virginia law.
3. Whether the evidence created a genuine dispute concerning the City of Dunbar's liability under Monell based on failure to train and persistent practice theories.
4. Whether statutory immunity and limits on punitive or noneconomic damages required judgment for Defendants or limitation of Plaintiff's recovery at the summary-judgment stage.

Disposition

other