Michael Milam v. Evan Burton, et al.

Summary

The court screened a pro se § 1983 action alleging that Columbia, Kentucky, officials restricted public comments on the Columbia Police Department's Facebook page. It dismissed the Columbia Police Department as a non-suable entity, dismissed official-capacity claims as duplicative of claims against the City, and dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims. The First Amendment claims against the City and the individual-capacity claims against the police chief and mayor were allowed to proceed.

Holdings

1. The Columbia Police Department is not a person subject to suit under § 1983, so the claims against it must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
2. The official-capacity claims against Burton and Hoots are claims against the City of Columbia and must be dismissed as duplicative of the claims against the City.
3. The First Amendment claims against the City of Columbia and Burton and Hoots in their individual capacities may proceed because, without reviewing the Facebook page and its comment restrictions, the court could not determine that the allegations failed to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
4. The Fourteenth Amendment claims must be dismissed because the alleged free-speech violation is governed by the specific protections of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment theory is duplicative.
5. The intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims against Burton and Hoots in their individual capacities must be dismissed because the complaint did not adequately allege severe or serious emotional distress and relied on conclusory allegations of humiliation, frustration, and anxiety.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the Columbia Police Department is a suable person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2. Whether the official-capacity claims against Burton and Hoots are duplicative of claims against the City of Columbia.
3. Whether Milam's allegations concerning the Facebook comment restrictions stated a potentially viable First Amendment claim at the screening stage.
4. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment free-speech claims were duplicative of the First Amendment claims.
5. Whether the complaint adequately alleged the severe or serious emotional distress required for a Kentucky intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.

Disposition

other