Marlon Castillo Moreno v. Kristi Noem et al.

Summary

The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan considers a habeas petition brought by an ICE detainee challenging the statutory and constitutional basis for his detention. The court declines to require administrative exhaustion and holds that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), rather than 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs detention of a noncitizen who entered and resided in the United States before being apprehended. The court conditionally grants the petition, concluding that due process requires an individualized bond hearing.

Holdings

1. Prudential exhaustion was not required because the central statutory question was purely legal, the constitutional challenge was not a procedural error correctable by the agency, and administrative review was unlikely to eliminate the need for judicial review. Alternatively, waiver of exhaustion was appropriate because pursuing administrative remedies would likely be futile and delay would impose hardship.
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), rather than § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs the detention of a noncitizen who entered the United States years earlier and was already residing within the country when apprehended and arrested.
3. Because Petitioner's detention was governed by § 1226(a), the discretionary detention framework required an individualized bond hearing. Detaining Petitioner under the mandatory-detention framework of § 1225(b)(2)(A) without that hearing violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
4. The Secretary of Homeland Security would not be dismissed because retaining her as a respondent ensured that the Court's conditional habeas relief could be enforced if Petitioner were transferred out of the district.

Questions Presented

1. Whether prudential exhaustion should be required before the Court considered the petitioner's § 2241 challenge to his immigration detention.
2. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) or 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governed the detention of a noncitizen who had entered and resided in the United States for years before being apprehended.
3. Whether detention under the mandatory-detention framework of § 1225(b)(2)(A), without an individualized bond hearing, violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
4. Whether the Secretary of Homeland Security was a proper respondent in light of the immediate-custodian rule and the possibility of transfer.

Disposition

writ_granted