Summary
The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Ebony Sherisse Lucas’s motions to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and to recuse Judge Kenneth D. Bell under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. The court concluded that Lucas had not shown clear error, manifest injustice, or legally sufficient grounds for recusal, and directed the Clerk to maintain the matter as closed subject to appeal.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Plaintiff satisfied the requirements for altering or amending the dismissal judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).
- Whether Plaintiff's affidavit and allegations established a basis for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144.
- Whether the circumstances required disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455.
Holdings
- A Rule 59(e) motion should be denied where the movant identifies no intervening change in controlling law, newly available evidence, clear error, or manifest injustice, and the motion merely seeks to relitigate issues or expresses disagreement with the court's ruling. Plaintiff did not establish clear error or manifest injustice.
- Recusal under § 144 was unwarranted because Plaintiff's affidavit was legally insufficient: it did not allege personal bias or prejudice arising from an extrajudicial source.
- Recusal under § 455 was not required because Plaintiff showed neither an objectively reasonable basis to question the judge's impartiality nor personal bias, personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts, extrajudicial bias, or antagonism making fair judgment impossible.
Key quotations
“A Rule 59(e) motion is discretionary. It need not be granted unless the district court finds that there has been an intervening change of controlling law, that new evidence has become available, or that there is a need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”
“To be considered legally sufficient the affidavits must allege personal bias or prejudice caused by an extrajudicial source other than what the judge has learned or experienced from his participation in the case.”
“The standard for disqualification under section 455 is “whether a reasonable person would have a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality, not whether the judge is in fact impartial.””
“opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”
Factual background
Plaintiff's claims concerned alleged deficiencies involving financial accounts, including the nature of the accounts, interest allegedly owed, amounts paid, and fees charged. After dismissal, Plaintiff argued that the court had clearly erred in stating that she failed to identify the relevant account numbers and that dismissal caused manifest injustice. Her recusal request relied on dissatisfaction with the court's rulings and did not identify an extrajudicial source of bias or prejudice.
Procedural history
The court had previously granted Defendants' motion to dismiss in an April 9, 2026 order. Plaintiff then filed a Rule 59(e) motion four business days after judgment and a motion for recusal supported by an affidavit of bias and prejudice. The court denied both motions and left the case closed subject to appeal.