Crowder v. Burress

Summary

The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, on remand from the Fourth Circuit, further addressed immunity issues concerning Daniel L. Crowder’s procedural and substantive due process damages claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court held that the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission members were entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity and that probation officer Kimberly Herman was entitled to absolute immunity, or alternatively qualified immunity. The court dismissed the individual-capacity claims on initial review.

Holdings

1. The Commission members were absolutely immune from Crowder's individual-capacity damages claims because imposing the discretionary no-contact condition was a quasi-judicial function functionally comparable to a judge's exercise of discretionary judgment.
2. Herman was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from Crowder's individual-capacity damages claims because communicating and administering the Commission's post-release-supervision condition constituted conduct performed in a quasi-judicial capacity.
3. Even if Herman's conduct was not protected by absolute immunity, she was entitled to qualified immunity because Crowder did not identify clearly established law recognizing a constitutional right of co-defendant spouses to contact or reside with one another during North Carolina post-release supervision.
4. The court did not construe Crowder's allegations against Herman as asserting a procedural due process claim based on the imposition of the condition; those allegations concerned only Herman's administration of a condition already imposed by the Commission.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the Commission members were absolutely immune from individual-capacity damages claims based on their discretionary imposition of a no-contact condition during post-release supervision.
2. Whether probation officer Bethany Herman was absolutely immune from damages claims based on administering and communicating the post-release-supervision condition.
3. Alternatively, whether Herman was entitled to qualified immunity because no clearly established law recognized a right of co-defendant spouses to reside together or have contact during North Carolina post-release supervision.
4. Whether Crowder adequately stated a procedural due process claim against Herman based on the administration of the already imposed condition.

Disposition

dismissed