Kevin Lee Crisel v. Terry Tuggle, Warden

Summary

The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma reviewed objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation denying Kevin Lee Crisel’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. The court held that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision concerning admission of prior-sexual-assault evidence was entitled to AEDPA deference and that the evidence did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. The court also rejected Crisel’s ineffective-assistance claims, denied a certificate of appealability, overruled the objections, and accepted the Report and Recommendation.

Holdings

1. When the state court rejects or resolves a federal claim without expressly discussing the federal constitutional ground, the federal habeas court must presume that the claim was adjudicated on the merits unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption; reliance on state evidentiary law alone was insufficient to rebut it here.
2. Crisel did not show that the state court's determination that admission of the prior-sexual-assault evidence did not render his trial fundamentally unfair was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent.
3. Crisel was not entitled to habeas relief on his claim that counsel failed to introduce a letter concerning his employment suspension because he did not establish prejudice.
4. Crisel did not establish that counsel's decision not to introduce evidence of his prior acquittal was deficient performance or prejudicial under Strickland, and the state court's rejection of the claim was not unreasonable under AEDPA.
5. The court denied a certificate of appealability because reasonable jurists could not debate the resolution of Crisel's claims.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals adjudicated Crisel's Fourteenth Amendment due-process challenge to the admission of prior-sexual-assault evidence on the merits for purposes of AEDPA deference.
2. Whether the state court's conclusion that admission of the other-acts evidence did not render Crisel's trial fundamentally unfair was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.
3. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence concerning Crisel's employment suspension.
4. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of Crisel's acquittal on prior sexual-assault charges.
5. Whether Crisel was entitled to a certificate of appealability.

Disposition

denied