Joseph D. Dunlap v. CoreCivic, et al.

Summary

The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee dismissed Joseph D. Dunlap’s amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint arising from an inmate stabbing at Whiteville Correctional Facility. The court dismissed the federal claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim, declined supplemental jurisdiction over Tennessee negligence claims, denied further leave to amend and appointment of counsel, and recommended that the dismissal count as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The court also certified that an appeal would not be taken in good faith and denied in forma pauperis status on appeal.

Holdings

1. A private corporation operating a prison may be treated like a municipality for § 1983 purposes, but it cannot be held liable on a respondeat-superior theory; the plaintiff must allege that a corporate policy or well-settled custom was the moving force behind the constitutional injury. Dunlap's conclusory allegation that CoreCivic had a history of misconduct did not adequately plead an actionable failure-to-train policy or custom.
2. The official-capacity claims were treated as claims against the defendants' employer, CoreCivic, and failed for the same reason as the direct claims against CoreCivic because Dunlap did not allege a corporate policy or custom that caused the alleged constitutional violations.
3. A prisoner has no inherent constitutional right to an effective prison grievance procedure, so allegations that grievance officials ignored or mishandled a grievance do not state a constitutional claim.
4. A § 1983 claim against a supervisory official requires personal involvement in the unconstitutional conduct or authorization, approval, or knowing acquiescence in it; Dunlap's allegations that Adams, Neil, and Vandyke had general responsibilities or should have acted safely did not satisfy that requirement.
5. An Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim requires allegations satisfying both an objective component—incarceration under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm—and a subjective component—that the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate safety. Dunlap did not plausibly allege that Marshall knew or should have known that Jones posed a reasonable likelihood of attacking Dunlap, so the claim failed.
6. After dismissing all federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the related Tennessee negligence claims and dismissed them without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
7. Further leave to amend was denied because the court had already afforded Dunlap an opportunity to amend and determined that further amendment would be futile. The motion to appoint counsel was denied after dismissal of the amended complaint.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Dunlap adequately pleaded a § 1983 claim against CoreCivic based on an alleged policy, custom, or failure to train.
2. Whether the official-capacity claims against the individual defendants were barred by the failure to allege a CoreCivic policy or custom causing the alleged constitutional violations.
3. Whether the claims against grievance officials stated a constitutional violation based on an allegedly ineffective prison grievance procedure.
4. Whether the claims against Adams, Neil, and Vandyke adequately alleged personal involvement or supervisory liability under § 1983.
5. Whether the claim against Marshall adequately alleged the objective and subjective components of an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim.
6. Whether the court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Tennessee negligence claims after dismissing all federal claims.
7. Whether further leave to amend and appointment of counsel should be denied.

Disposition

dismissed