Sarah Broggin v. Atlantic Housing Foundation, Inc., et al.

Broggin · United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, Lynchburg Division · March 20, 2026 · No. 6:25-CV-00013

Summary

The court denied defendants’ motions to strike portions of Sarah Broggin’s second amended complaint and to dismiss her negligence per se claims. The court held that allegations and exhibits concerning fire-code violations and nonfunctioning fire-safety equipment were material and pertinent, and that the complaint sufficiently alleged negligence per se under Virginia law. The negligence per se claims were permitted to proceed to discovery.

Court
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, Lynchburg Division
Jurisdiction
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia
Decision date
March 20, 2026
Docket number
6:25-CV-00013
Disposition
other

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Paragraph 15 and two exhibits attached to the second amended complaint were immaterial or impertinent and should be stricken under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).
  2. Whether Broggin sufficiently alleged negligence per se under Virginia law based on alleged violations of the Virginia Statewide Fire Prevention Code and related fire-safety requirements.
  3. Whether the age of the apartment building, which was constructed in 1970, defeated the negligence per se claims at the pleading stage.

Holdings

  1. The allegations and exhibits were material and pertinent because they logically related to Broggin's claims that Defendants negligently failed to maintain the property and fire-safety equipment. Defendants had not shown that the material had no possible relation to the controversy or would cause significant prejudice, so the motion to strike was denied.
  2. Broggin sufficiently alleged negligence per se because she identified statutes or codes that could create a duty, alleged that she was within the protected class, alleged the type of harm addressed by the fire-safety requirements, and alleged that Defendants' violations proximately caused her injuries. Counts II and IV could proceed to discovery.
  3. The building's construction in 1970 did not defeat the negligence per se claims at the pleading stage because the Statewide Fire Prevention Code could require maintenance of existing fire-safety equipment even if it did not require installation of new, state-of-the-art systems.

Court Document

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