Robert A. Johnson v. Raven Wood Homeowners Association

Summary

The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington denied Robert A. Johnson’s motion to strike Defendant Carl E. Krieger’s answer. The court held that the answer was not impermissibly redundant, that Krieger’s attorney-fee counterclaim was not a basis for striking the answer, that his representation and signatures complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and that changed circumstances permitted him to litigate defenses and counterclaims despite the court’s prior rulings.

Holdings

1. The answer was not impermissibly redundant because Krieger asserted that he acted as an official representative and agent of the homeowners association, making overlap between his conduct and the entity's conduct legally relevant; the Rule 12(f) challenge was therefore meritless.
2. Krieger's request for attorney's fees was not a viable basis for striking the answer. The Fair Housing Act permits a court, in its discretion, to award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing party, and a defendant may recover fees when the plaintiff's action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.
3. Krieger's signature on the answer and identification of himself as pro se did not violate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or constitute impermissible hybrid representation because defense counsel had entered an appearance and also signed the answer.
4. The prior summary-judgment ruling did not preclude Krieger from litigating defenses, asserting facts, admitting or denying allegations, or pursuing a counterclaim for attorney's fees because changed circumstances existed after the order of default was overturned and Krieger had not previously participated in the case.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Krieger's answer contained impermissibly redundant material subject to being stricken under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).
2. Whether Krieger could assert a request or counterclaim for attorney's fees in his answer in this Fair Housing Act and civil-rights litigation.
3. Whether Krieger's signature on the answer and his identification as pro se constituted impermissible hybrid representation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a).
4. Whether the Court's prior summary-judgment ruling and the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded Krieger from litigating defenses, counterclaims, or attorney's fees after the order of default was overturned.

Disposition

other