Ford Motor Co. v. Boomer; Honeywell International, Inc. v. Boomer, 285 Va. 141

Summary

The Supreme Court of Virginia considered paired appeals arising from a mesothelioma wrongful-death verdict against Ford Motor Company and Honeywell International, the successor to Bendix. The court rejected the use of an undefined “substantial contributing factor” standard and held that, in multiple-exposure mesothelioma cases, causation should be analyzed under a multiple-sufficient-causes approach. It reversed and remanded for further proceedings and declined to reach the sufficiency-of-the-evidence and expert-testimony issues under the revised causation standard.

Holdings

1. Virginia law does not permit the undefined "substantial contributing factor" standard used in the jury instructions. In a concurring-causation mesothelioma case, the plaintiff must prove that exposure attributable to each defendant was, more likely than not, sufficient by itself to have caused the mesothelioma, and that the exposure occurred before the cancer developed.
2. The court declined to decide whether the trial evidence was sufficient to establish that Ford's or Bendix's products proximately caused Lokey's mesothelioma because the case had been tried under an incorrect causation standard.
3. The court declined to reach the assignments of error concerning the admissibility and foundation of the expert testimony because the experts' opinions were tied to the impermissible substantial-contributing-factor theory and would have to be reconsidered under the proper causation standard.
4. The evidence was sufficient for a jury to find that defendants' failure to warn was a proximate cause of Lokey's injury, even though Virginia does not recognize a heeding presumption and Lokey did not testify directly that he would have followed an adequate warning.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the circuit court improperly instructed the jury to determine whether defendants' negligence was a "substantial contributing factor" in causing mesothelioma.
2. What causation standard applies in a multiple-exposure mesothelioma case under Virginia law.
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish proximate cause despite evidence of a potentially more likely alternative asbestos exposure.
4. Whether the circuit court erred in admitting or permitting the estate's expert causation testimony.
5. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that defendants' failure to warn was a proximate cause of Lokey's injury despite the absence of direct testimony that Lokey would have heeded an adequate warning.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded