Reykdal v. Espinoza

Summary

The Washington Supreme Court reversed an order requiring removal of a sentence from Maia Espinoza’s candidate statement in the state voters’ pamphlet. The court held that Chris Reykdal, a public official, could not show a substantial likelihood of prevailing in a defamation action because the statement was not demonstrably false and there was no showing of actual malice. A dissent would have upheld the removal under RCW 29A.32.090.

Holdings

1. The statement was not demonstrably false because the curriculum materials and parent handout could reasonably lead fourth graders, with parental involvement, to view and learn from a book depicting sexual positions. Reykdal therefore failed to establish the falsity necessary for a substantial likelihood of success in defamation.
2. A public official must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the allegedly defamatory statement was made with actual malice—knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for whether it was false.
3. The statutory reference to defamation per se concerns the damages element and does not eliminate the First Amendment requirement that a public official prove actual malice.

Questions Presented

1. Whether RCW 29A.32.090 authorized removal of Espinoza's candidate-statement sentence because the statement was untrue and Reykdal had a very substantial likelihood of prevailing in a defamation action.
2. Whether Reykdal, a public official, could satisfy the actual-malice requirement applicable to defamation claims involving criticism of public officials.
3. Whether the reference to defamation per se in RCW 29A.32.090 eliminated the actual-malice requirement or otherwise permitted removal without proof of actual malice.

Disposition

reversed