In re the Recall Charges Against Port of Seattle Commissioner Davis

164 Wash. 2d 361 (2008) · Supreme Court of Washington · August 14, 2008

Summary

The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the factual and legal sufficiency of recall charges against Port of Seattle Commissioner Pat Davis. The court held that the charge alleging Davis signed a memorandum potentially obligating the Port to pay an outgoing employee was sufficient, but charges alleging violations of the Open Public Meetings Act were insufficient because the petitioner lacked adequate factual knowledge supporting them. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for preparation of a revised ballot synopsis.

Holdings

  1. A recall petition must be factually and legally sufficient. Factual sufficiency requires a prima facie showing of misfeasance, malfeasance, or violation of the oath of office, while legal sufficiency requires substantial conduct amounting to one of those grounds.
  2. Charges alleging that Davis voted in executive session in violation of the Open Public Meetings Act were factually insufficient because the record did not establish that the petitioner had personal knowledge that any vote occurred.
  3. The charge that Davis signed a memorandum with the potential effect of obligating the Port to pay Dinsmore at least $239,000 outside his employment contract was factually sufficient.
  4. The memorandum charge was legally sufficient because, accepting the allegations as true, signing an agreement that could obligate Port funds without a public vote constituted a prima facie case of malfeasance.
  5. At the recall-petition sufficiency stage, the reviewing court does not decide whether the charges are true; it determines whether, accepting the allegations as true, they facially support a conclusion that the officer abused her position.

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the recall charges were factually sufficient under chapter 29A.56 RCW.
  2. Whether the recall charges were legally sufficient because, accepting the allegations as true, they established a prima facie case of malfeasance, misfeasance, or violation of the oath of office.
  3. Whether allegations that Davis voted in executive session were supported by the petitioner's required personal knowledge.
  4. Whether Davis's signed memorandum had the potential effect of obligating the Port to pay transition benefits without prior public approval.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded

Cases Cited (8)

  • Chandler v. Otto, 103 Wn.2d 268, 270, 693 P.2d 71 (1984)(followed)
  • In re Recall of Wasson, 149 Wn.2d 787, 791, 72 P.3d 170 (2003)(followed)
  • In re Recall of Young, 152 Wn.2d 848, 852, 100 P.3d 307 (2004)(followed)
  • In re Recall of West, 155 Wn.2d 659, 666 n.3, 121 P.3d 1190 (2005)(followed and distinguished)
  • In re Recall of Beasley, 128 Wn.2d 419, 908 P.2d 878 (1996)(followed)
  • In re Recall of Sandhaus, 134 Wn.2d 662, 670, 953 P.2d 82 (1998)(distinguished)
  • In re Recall of Zufelt, 112 Wn.2d 906, 774 P.2d 1223 (1989)(followed)
  • In re Recall of East, 144 Wn.2d 807, 813, 31 P.3d 677 (2001)(followed)

Cited In (0)

No citing cases on record yet.

Court Document

Open PDF
Loading document…