Twin Bridge Marine Park, LLC v. Department of Ecology

Summary

The Washington Supreme Court held that the Department of Ecology could not impose penalties based on its disagreement with Skagit County’s final land use and building-permit decisions without first challenging those decisions under the Land Use Petition Act. The court concluded that the Shoreline Management Act gave the county exclusive authority to administer the applicable substantial-development permitting system, and that Twin Bridge was entitled to rely on the county’s permits. The court affirmed the trial court and Court of Appeals.

Holdings

1. Ecology may not directly impose Shoreline Management Act penalties against a project that was constructed in compliance with valid county permits when the penalties constitute a collateral attack on the County's final land use decision. Ecology must challenge that decision through the Land Use Petition Act.
2. The County's permits were primarily substantial development permits, not conditional use permits, and the County therefore retained exclusive authority to determine whether the marina development complied with the County's shoreline master plan and existing permits.
3. The County's reinstatement of Twin Bridge's building permits was a final land use decision, and Ecology's failure to timely appeal that decision under LUPA precluded its later collateral challenge through penalties.

Questions Presented

1. Whether Ecology could directly impose penalties under the Shoreline Management Act against a project constructed pursuant to valid county building permits without first challenging the County's final land use decision under the Land Use Petition Act.
2. Whether the County-issued permits were primarily substantial development permits, over which the County had exclusive administrative authority, rather than conditional use permits subject to Ecology's direct review.
3. Whether the County's reinstatement of the building permits constituted a final land use decision that Ecology was required to challenge within the Land Use Petition Act's statutory period.

Disposition

affirmed