In re the Personal Restraint of Gentry

Summary

The Washington Supreme Court considered whether the transfer of a death-row inmate from a special housing unit to intensive management housing, resulting in solitary confinement, violated constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto punishment. The court held that solitary confinement was contemplated by Washington law and regulations at the time of the petitioner’s crime and sentence, that prior participation in a housing-incentive program created no continuing liberty interest, and dismissed the personal restraint petition.

Holdings

1. The conditions of confinement imposed on Gentry in the intensive management unit did not constitute ex post facto punishment because solitary confinement and intensive management unit placement were contemplated by Washington law and DOC regulations when he committed the crime and was sentenced.
2. Gentry had no liberty interest or legitimate claim of entitlement to continued special housing unit placement, human contact, or related privileges because DOC retained broad discretion to assign or withdraw such housing for administrative, protective, or disciplinary reasons.
3. Gentry was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the undisputed legal and regulatory framework established that he was not unlawfully restrained.

Questions Presented

1. Whether returning Gentry from the special housing unit to the intensive management unit subjected him to an increased punishment in violation of the state and federal constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws.
2. Whether Gentry had a protected liberty interest in continued special housing unit placement and its attendant privileges based on his prior good behavior and earned good-time credit.
3. Whether Gentry was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

Disposition

dismissed