State v. Davis, 175 Wn. 2d 287

Summary

The Washington Supreme Court reviewed Cecil Davis’s second capital penalty proceeding after his original death sentence was vacated because jurors had seen him in shackles. The court rejected challenges concerning judicial recusal, dismissal of prospective jurors for cause, and exclusion of mitigation evidence, and affirmed the death sentence.

Holdings

1. A violation of the prohibition on ex parte judicial communication does not automatically require recusal. Recusal is required when, viewed objectively and with knowledge of the relevant facts, the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The scheduling communication did not demonstrate bias or create a reasonable appearance of partiality.
2. The trial court properly dismissed jurors whose views or knowledge could substantially impair their ability to perform their duties impartially in a capital penalty proceeding. A trial judge may excuse a juror for cause on the judge's own motion when grounds for challenge are present.
3. In a capital penalty proceeding, relevant mitigating evidence may not be excluded through a mechanistic application of the hearsay rule, but the trial court retains authority to impose reasonable reliability limits on the form in which mitigating evidence is presented. The court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the aunts' largely irrelevant and unreliable videotaped interviews.
4. A police officer's firsthand observations of a capital defendant's behavior shortly after the crime may be admitted as lay rebuttal evidence when the defense has placed the defendant's mental functioning in issue and the testimony is based on personal observations rather than an expert diagnosis.
5. The Constitution does not require a separate jury instruction identifying every potentially relevant nonstatutory mitigating circumstance. An instruction directing jurors to consider any relevant mitigating factors, while listing statutory factors, adequately permits consideration of major mental illness and other relevant mitigation.
6. The challenged prosecutorial comments did not require reversal. Although the imagined dialogue between the victim and Davis approached impropriety and the prosecutor implied that vaginal scrubbing occurred while the victim was alive, the unobjected-to remarks were not sufficiently flagrant or ill-intentioned, and the remaining comments were either proper or nonprejudicial.
7. Washington's death penalty scheme does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment based on the asserted arbitrary imposition of death sentences. The court declined to reach Davis's developed state constitutional challenge because it was inadequately preserved and the record was insufficient.
8. The limited errors identified in the penalty proceeding, considered cumulatively, did not deprive Davis of a fair sentencing proceeding and did not warrant reversal.
9. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that mitigating circumstances did not warrant leniency, the death sentence was not excessive or disproportionate to sentences in similar cases, the sentence was not imposed through passion or prejudice, and Davis was not intellectually disabled. The death sentence therefore remained valid.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to recuse after ex parte communication with prosecutors concerning scheduling.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing two prospective jurors for cause.
3. Whether excluding videotaped interviews of Davis's aunts violated his right to present mitigating evidence.
4. Whether the trial court properly admitted a police officer's testimony concerning Davis's mental state shortly after the crime as rebuttal evidence.
5. Whether the jury instructions adequately permitted consideration of major mental illness and other mitigating circumstances.
6. Whether the prosecutor's closing argument constituted prejudicial misconduct or denied Davis a fair capital sentencing proceeding.
7. Whether Washington's death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment or article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution.
8. Whether cumulative error required reversal.
9. Whether the death sentence was invalid under RCW 10.95.130 based on insufficient mitigating-evidence support, disproportionality, passion or prejudice, or intellectual disability.

Disposition

affirmed