Summary
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed and remanded a circuit court decision holding that an easement benefiting the defendants' property had been extinguished by abandonment and adverse possession. The court held that the evidence did not clearly and convincingly establish abandonment and did not establish the exclusive possession required for adverse possession. It also held that a retained easement holder was an indispensable party and remanded for joinder, determination of the easement's width and subdivision-access issues, and reconsideration of attorney fees and costs.
Holdings
- The circuit court erred in finding that the prescriptive easement had been abandoned because the evidence did not clearly and convincingly establish an intent by the easement holders to relinquish their rights.
- The circuit court erred in finding that the easement had been extinguished by adverse possession because the evidence did not establish the required exclusive possession of the right-of-way by the adverse claimant.
- Dennis G. Largent, II, was an indispensable party because he retained a right to use the right-of-way and the proceeding directly affected his real-property interest.
- The case had to be remanded for further development and determination of whether the historically established right-of-way was sufficiently wide to provide ingress and egress to a subdivision under applicable Hampshire County ordinances.
- The circuit court was directed to reconsider attorney fees and costs after resolving the remaining issues on remand.
Questions Presented
- Whether the evidence clearly and convincingly established abandonment of the prescriptive easement.
- Whether the easement was extinguished by adverse possession.
- Whether Dennis G. Largent, II, was an indispensable party because he retained a right to use the roadway.
- Whether the circuit court failed to resolve the width of the right-of-way and whether it could lawfully provide access to a subdivision under Hampshire County subdivision ordinances.
- Whether the award of attorney fees and costs should stand after reversal and remand.
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded
Cases Cited (12)
- Burgess v. Porterfield, 196 W. Va. 178, 469 S.E.2d 114 (1996)(followed)
- Strahin v. Lantz, 193 W. Va. 285, 456 S.E.2d 12 (1995)(followed)
- Keller v. Hartman, 175 W. Va. 418, 333 S.E.2d 89 (1985)(followed)
- Berkeley Development Corp. v. Hutzler, 159 W. Va. 844, 229 S.E.2d 732 (1976)(followed)
- McNeil v. Kennedy, 88 W. Va. 524, 107 S.E. 203 (1921)(followed)
- Walton v. Knight, 62 W. Va. 223, 58 S.E. 1025 (1907)(followed)
- Bauer Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Elkins, 173 W. Va. 438, 317 S.E.2d 798 (1984)(followed)
- Higgins v. Suburban Improvement Co., 108 W. Va. 531, 151 S.E. 842 (1930)(followed)
- Rudolph v. Glendale Improvement Co., 103 W. Va. 81, 137 S.E. 349 (1927)(followed)
- White v. Lambert, 175 W. Va. 253, 332 S.E.2d 266 (1985)(followed)
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