West Virginia Human Rights Commission v. Esquire Group, Inc.

Summary

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that a housing discrimination claim brought by the West Virginia Human Rights Commission and intervening homeowners was not barred by res judicata following an earlier restrictive-covenant action. The court concluded that the homeowners’ daughter and the Commission were not in privity with the parties to the earlier action, reversed summary judgment for Esquire Group, and remanded for trial.

Holdings

1. A parent-child relationship does not automatically create privity for claim-preclusion purposes. Because the parents litigated the restrictive-covenant action in their individual capacities and did not represent Rebecca's distinct statutory fair-housing interest, Rebecca was not in privity with them.
2. The Human Rights Commission was not in privity with the Blacks for purposes of the prior restrictive-covenant action.
3. The Human Rights Commission's housing-discrimination action was not barred by res judicata because it was not the same cause of action as the prior restrictive-covenant proceeding and could not have afforded the same relief in that proceeding.
4. The housing-discrimination claim was not required to be asserted as a compulsory counterclaim in the prior restrictive-covenant action because the Blacks were not entitled to assert Rebecca's claim in their individual capacities and the prior case did not include the necessary parties.
5. The grant of summary judgment could not be sustained on the reasonable-accommodation issue because substantial factual issues remained regarding the elements of the housing-discrimination claim and whether Esquire's proposed accommodation was reasonable.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the housing-discrimination claim was barred by res judicata because of the prior restrictive-covenant injunction proceeding.
2. Whether Rebecca Black and the West Virginia Human Rights Commission were parties or in privity with parties to the prior restrictive-covenant proceeding.
3. Whether the housing-discrimination claim was a compulsory counterclaim that should have been asserted in the prior proceeding.
4. Whether the housing-discrimination claim brought by the Human Rights Commission constituted the same cause of action as the prior restrictive-covenant claim for res judicata purposes.
5. Whether summary judgment was proper on the issue of reasonable accommodation.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded