State of West Virginia v. Richard Winning

Summary

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the revocation of Richard Winning’s supervised release and his twenty-year sentence. The court rejected his arguments that the sentence was disproportionate, violated ex post facto protections, or was impermissible because of a prior probation-related disposition. The court held that West Virginia law authorized the supervised-release term and the post-revocation sentence, and that the circuit court awarded applicable credit for time served.

Holdings

1. The twenty-year sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release did not violate West Virginia's constitutional proportionality principle or the Eighth Amendment because it did not shock the conscience and Winning failed to establish disproportionality under the objective test.
2. Imposition of a fifty-year supervised-release term was not an impermissible ex post facto application because the version of West Virginia Code § 62-12-26 in effect when Winning committed the offense already authorized up to fifty years of supervised release.
3. The circuit court was authorized to revoke the fifty-year supervised-release term and impose up to the remaining supervised-release period, including the twenty-year sentence imposed here; Winning was not limited to the prior one-year sentence.
4. Winning was not entitled to credit against supervised release for time served on the original incarceration sentence, and the record showed that the circuit court awarded the credit for time served awaiting resolution of the revocation proceeding to which he was entitled.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the twenty-year post-revocation sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate under the West Virginia and United States constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.
2. Whether imposing up to fifty years of supervised release violated ex post facto protections because the charging information did not allege that the offense occurred after enactment of the supervised-release statute.
3. Whether the circuit court was limited to the prior one-year sentence because Winning had allegedly been returned to probation rather than supervised release.
4. Whether Winning was entitled to credit against supervised release or the revocation sentence for time served on his original incarceration sentence or while awaiting resolution of the revocation proceeding.

Disposition

affirmed