Tensfeldt v. Haberman

Summary

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed claims against attorneys arising from estate plans that allegedly violated a divorce judgment and failed to account for Florida elective-share law. The court held that Attorney LaBudde was liable as a matter of law for intentionally aiding and abetting a client's violation of the enforceable judgment and was not entitled to qualified immunity or the good faith advice privilege. It also held that the children could not establish causation for their negligence claim against LaBudde and affirmed summary judgment for Attorney Haberman because the children's negligence claim lacked sufficient evidence of harm.

Holdings

1. The divorce judgment was enforceable when entered and during the period from 1980 through 1992 when LaBudde drafted the noncompliant estate plans.
2. LaBudde was liable as a matter of law for intentionally aiding and abetting Robert's unlawful violation of the divorce judgment.
3. LaBudde was not entitled to qualified immunity from the children's aiding-and-abetting claim.
4. The good faith advice privilege did not protect LaBudde because he drafted documents that effectuated a violation of a court judgment rather than merely providing advice concerning a contractual breach.
5. The children could not maintain their negligence claim against LaBudde because they could not establish that his negligence thwarted Robert's clear testamentary intent.
6. Haberman was not liable to the children for negligent advice because he neither drafted nor supervised execution of the estate plan, and the Auric exception does not extend to negligent advice alone.
7. The children failed to present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning harm caused by Haberman's negligent advice.

Questions Presented

1. Whether the divorce judgment requiring Robert to maintain a will benefiting his adult children was enforceable when LaBudde assisted Robert in preparing noncompliant estate plans.
2. Whether LaBudde's conduct constituted intentional aiding and abetting of Robert's unlawful violation of the divorce judgment.
3. Whether LaBudde was protected from third-party liability by qualified attorney immunity or the good faith advice privilege.
4. Whether the children could maintain a third-party negligence claim against LaBudde under the will-beneficiary exception recognized in Auric.
5. Whether Haberman could be liable to the children for negligent estate-planning advice when he neither drafted nor supervised execution of the estate plan.
6. Whether the evidence of harm caused by Haberman's negligence was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.

Disposition

reversed_and_remanded