

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
INDIANA

Jawuan Crystal Boykin v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission of Indiana

Boykin · No. No. 4:25-cv-00207-SEB-KMB · Decided May 22, 2026

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana dismissed Jawuan Crystal Boykin's action against the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of Indiana with prejudice. The court concluded that the amended pleading failed to allege sufficient facts supporting a plausible conspiracy claim and improperly sought to relitigate claims previously dismissed in an earlier action. All pending motions were denied as moot, and final judgment was ordered.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Sarah Evans Barker
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana
DECIDED	May 22, 2026
DOCKET	No. 4:25-cv-00207-SEB-KMB
DISPOSITION	dismissed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	The district court screened a self-represented plaintiff's amended pleading under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and its inherent authority, despite the plaintiff's failure to pay the filing fee or seek in forma pauperis status.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court may dismiss an action that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant. For the failure-to-state-a-claim inquiry, the court applied the Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard, accepting factual allegations as true and asking whether they stated a facially plausible claim.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	unpublished

TOPICS

pleadings

civil procedure

motions to dismiss

subject matter jurisdiction

section 1983

PRACTICE AREAS

civil procedure

civil rights

employment law

administrative law

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the amended pleading stated a plausible conspiracy claim against the EEOC.
2. Whether the action was an improper attempt to relitigate or circumvent the dismissal of claims in EEOC I and therefore constituted an abuse of the judicial process.
3. Whether further amendment should be permitted.

HOLDINGS

1. The pleading failed to state a plausible conspiracy claim because it did not provide particularized facts identifying the alleged conspirators, the general purpose of the conspiracy, or the approximate dates of the alleged conspiracy.
2. The action was an improper attempt to relitigate and circumvent the dismissal of claims in EEOC I, constituting an abuse of the judicial process.
3. Further amendment was not warranted because it would be futile or otherwise unwarranted; the action was therefore dismissed with prejudice.

KEY QUOTATIONS

"Before defendants in a conspiracy case become entangled in discovery proceedings, the plaintiff must meet a high standard of plausibility."

"Refusal to take no for an answer, and a campaign of unending litigation, are intolerable and sanctionable."

"For the reasons stated above, this action is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice in its entirety."

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Boykin alleged that the EEOC conspired with her former employers in connection with the EEOC's handling of her wrongful-termination claims. Her pleading identified alleged errors in the EEOC's proceedings but did not identify the individuals involved, the conspiracy's general purpose, or when it allegedly occurred. The action substantially repeated allegations previously asserted in EEOC I, which had been dismissed after Boykin failed to state a plausible claim.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Boykin filed this action against the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission of Indiana on October 22, 2025, alleging that the EEOC conspired with her former employers in connection with wrongful-termination claims. The court had previously dismissed Boykin's related action, EEOC I, without prejudice for failure to

state a plausible claim and failure to invoke subject matter jurisdiction. The court also imposed a limited filing ban based on repetitive and frivolous filings. After screening the present pleading, the court dismissed the action with prejudice and denied all pending motions as moot.

DISPOSITION

dismissed

CASES CITED

- Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989)
- Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999)
- Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992)
- Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
- Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009)
- Caine v. Burge, No. 11 C 8996, 2012 WL 2458640, at *9 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 2012)
- Averhart v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., Ill., 752 F.3d 1104, 1106 (7th Cir. 2014)
- O'Boyle v. Real Time Resols., Inc., 910 F.3d 338, 347 (7th Cir. 2018)