

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
MICHIGAN, SOUTHERN DIVISION

Ozormoor v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

Ozormoor · No. 4:25-cv-10710; opinion identifies case as No. 25-cv-10710 · Decided December 11, 2025

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan overruled Joseph Ozormoor’s objections to a magistrate judge’s order denying his motion for a protective order. The court held that Ozormoor had not shown good cause to limit the deposition’s location, start time, duration, scope, or attendance, and found no clear error or legal defect in the magistrate judge’s ruling.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division
WRITING FOR THE COURT	F. Kay Behm
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division
DECIDED	December 11, 2025
DOCKET	4:25-cv-10710; opinion identifies case as No. 25-cv-10710
DISPOSITION	other
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Plaintiff objected under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) to a magistrate judge's order denying his motion for a protective order concerning the location, timing, duration, scope, and attendance of his deposition.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), a district judge reviews objections to a magistrate judge's order on a nondispositive matter and may modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Factual findings are reviewed for clear error, meaning reversal is warranted only when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	unpublished district court opinion; nonprecedential
PARTIES	Joseph Ozormoor v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife)

TOPICS

discovery dispute

civil procedure

insurance

breach of contract

torts

PRACTICE AREAS

civil procedure

discovery

insurance

contracts

torts

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the magistrate judge clearly erred or acted contrary to law in refusing to require that the deposition occur in Detroit rather than at defense counsel's Troy office.
2. Whether the magistrate judge clearly erred or acted contrary to law in refusing to limit the deposition to a start time of 11:00 a.m. or later and to two hours.
3. Whether the magistrate judge erred in declining to limit the subject matter of the deposition or the persons permitted to attend.

HOLDINGS

1. The district court held that the magistrate judge did not clearly err or act contrary to law by refusing to prohibit the deposition from occurring at defense counsel's Troy office. Ozormoor had not shown good cause for a location restriction because he could use alternative transportation or a route avoiding freeways.
2. The district court held that the magistrate judge did not clearly err or act contrary to law by declining to limit the deposition to a start time of 11:00 a.m. or later or to two hours.
3. The district court held that there was no basis to limit the deposition to questions about the GUL policy or to restrict attendance to the parties and their attorneys of record.
4. A district court reviews timely objections under Rule 72(a) and may modify or set aside the magistrate judge's order only if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

KEY QUOTATIONS

"The district judge must then consider any timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the magistrate judge's order that is "clearly erroneous or contrary to law."" (Opinion text following PageID.578)

"If Ozormoor has medical conditions that prevent his driving on freeways, this does not prevent him from reaching counsel's Troy location; Ozormoor may take a taxi, Lyft, or Uber, or he can use a route that avoids freeways." (PageID.577)

"Thus the court does not find any error in the conclusion that Plaintiff can take the steps necessary for him to attend a deposition before 11 a.m." (PageID.590)

"Plaintiff's objections are OVERRULED." (PageID.590)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Ozormoor, an attorney proceeding pro se, sued MetLife asserting breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, statutory conversion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. MetLife repeatedly attempted to schedule Ozormoor's deposition, but he objected to being deposed, failed to appear for a noticed deposition, and did not provide workable alternative dates. After the magistrate judge ordered him to appear and denied his motion for a protective order, Ozormoor sought restrictions on the deposition's location, start time, duration, scope, and attendees based primarily on alleged medical conditions, age, travel concerns, and scheduling difficulties.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

MetLife noticed Ozormoor's deposition after attempting to schedule it with him. Ozormoor failed to appear for the noticed deposition, prompting MetLife to move to compel the deposition and seek sanctions. The magistrate judge granted the motion in part, ordered Ozormoor to sit for a deposition, later denied his motion for a protective order, and warned that sanctions could result from continued noncompliance. The district court overruled Ozormoor's objections to the protective-order ruling.

DISPOSITION

other

CASES CITED

- United States v. Mabry, 518 F.3d 442, 449 (6th Cir. 2008)
- United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)
- Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)
- Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985)
- Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985)
- Hall v. Rawal, 2012 WL 3639070 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2012)