

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
NORTH CAROLINA, STATESVILLE DIVISION

Ann Hartline, O/B/O K.H. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of
Social Security

Hartline · No. 5:24-CV-00261-KDB · Decided March 27, 2026

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina reviewed the denial of supplemental security income benefits sought on behalf of a minor claimant. The court held that the Administrative Law Judge applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence supported the finding that the claimant did not have a marked limitation in attending and completing tasks. The court granted the Commissioner’s motion, denied the appeal, and affirmed the Commissioner’s decision.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, Statesville Division
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Kenneth D. Bell
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, Statesville Division
DECIDED	March 27, 2026
DOCKET	5:24-CV-00261-KDB
DISPOSITION	affirmed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner's final administrative decision denying a minor claimant's application for supplemental security income.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	The court must affirm if the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and the decision is supported by substantial evidence. The court does not review de novo, reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	unpublished
PARTIES	Ann Hartline, O/B/O K.H. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

TOPICS

judicial review of agency action

administrative law

standard of review

disability definition

appellate procedure

PRACTICE AREAS

Social Security disability

administrative law

judicial review of agency action

appellate procedure

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the ALJ erred by finding that K.H. had less than a marked limitation in the domain of attending and completing tasks.
2. Whether the Commissioner's denial of supplemental security income was supported by substantial evidence and applied the correct legal standards.

HOLDINGS

1. The ALJ's finding was supported by substantial evidence because the record contained evidence that K.H. completed assignments, participated in class, asked questions, had largely low-average scores in relevant neuropsychological measures, received conservative treatment, and performed daily activities inconsistent with a marked limitation.
2. The court did not reach the acquiring-and-using-information domain because Plaintiff did not allege an extreme limitation and therefore challenged only whether the two domains had marked limitations.

KEY QUOTATIONS

“The scope of review under § 405(g) is limited; the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld “if the ALJ applied correct legal standards and if the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.”” (at 3)

“In reviewing for substantial evidence” in support of an ALJ’s factual findings, “[the reviewing court] do[es] not undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ].” (at 4)

“Put simply, the ALJ balanced the conflicting evidence in the record to reach a conclusion that a reasonable mind could accept as sufficient.” (at 7)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

K.H., a minor, applied for supplemental security income alleging disability beginning April 9, 2007. The ALJ found severe impairments including ADHD, borderline intellectual functioning, depression, and developmental delay, but found no marked limitation in the domain of attending and completing tasks. The ALJ relied on school performance, neuropsychological testing, conservative ADHD treatment, medication history, and daily activities in evaluating the functional-equivalence domains.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ann Hartline applied on behalf of her grandson, K.H., for supplemental security income. The claim was denied initially and on reconsideration; following an administrative hearing, an ALJ denied the application on October 24, 2023, and the Appeals Council denied review on October 22, 2024. The district court reviewed the administrative record and affirmed the Commissioner's decision, denied the appeal, granted the Commissioner's motion to affirm, and ordered the case closed.

DISPOSITION

affirmed

CASES CITED

- Drumgold v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 144 F.4th 596, 604 (4th Cir. 2025)
- Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102-03 (2019)
- Metcalf v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986)
- Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990)
- Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005)
- Boing v. Raleigh & G.R. Co., 87 N.C. 360 (N.C. 1882)
- Sedar v. Reston Town Ctr. Prop., LLC, 988 F.3d 756 (4th Cir. 2021)
- Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012)
- Shinaberry v. Saul, 952 F.3d 113, 123 (4th Cir. 2020)
- Lester v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 838, 841 (4th Cir. 1982)
- Long v. Kijakazi, No. 1:22-CV-00091-KDB, 2022 WL 18026331, at *2-3 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 30, 2022)
- Drumgold v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 144 F.4th 596, 605 (4th Cir. 2025)

OPINION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA STATESVILLE DIVISION CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:24-CV-00261-KDB ANN HARTLINE, O/B/O K.H., Plaintiff, v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER FRANK BISIGNANO, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant. THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Ann Hartline’s appeal of an unfavorable administrative decision denying her minor grandson’s application for supplemental security income under the Social Security Act.

(Doc. No. 9). Having reviewed and considered the parties’ briefs, the administrative record, and the applicable authority, the Court finds the Defendant Commissioner’s decision to deny K.H. Social Security benefits is supported by substantial evidence and uses the correct legal standards.

Accordingly, the Commissioner’s decision will be AFFIRMED. I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On June 22, 2021, Plaintiff applied for supplemental security income benefits on behalf of her minor grandson, K.H., alleging he had been disabled since April 9, 2007.¹ Doc. No. 4 at 18. Her claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. Plaintiff then requested a

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), where she and K.H. were represented by an attorney.

1 K.H. was previously awarded supplemental income benefits that were terminated in 2010. Doc. No. 4 at 18. Id. After conducting the hearing, ALJ Wyly Jordan III denied Plaintiff’s application in a decision dated October 24, 2023. Id. at 31. Plaintiff sought review by the Appeals Council, which was denied on October 22, 2024. Id. at 5–7.

The ALJ’s determination therefore stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff now timely seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). II. THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION

An individual under the age of 18 will be considered disabled under the Social Security Act if he suffers from a “medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and that can be expected to cause death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.906.

The ALJ must follow a three-step sequential analysis to determine whether an individual under the age of 18 is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924. The first step of this process is determining whether the claimant is participating in substantial gainful activity. § 416.924(b). A claimant participating in substantial gainful activity is not eligible for SSI. Id. Substantial gainful activity is work activity that is both substantial and the kind of work that is usually done for pay.

20 C.F.R. § 416.972. Because K.H. was approximately fourteen years old at the time of the hearing, the ALJ determined that he was not engaged in substantial gainful activity. Doc. No. 4 at 19. Therefore, at step one, K.H. was still eligible for SSI.

The ALJ then proceeded to step two—an inquiry into whether K.H. met the requirement of having a severe medically determinable impairment. § 416.924(c). For an impairment to be severe, the claimant must experience more than minimal functional limitations. Id. The ALJ determined that K.H. had the following severe impairments: “attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), borderline intellectual functioning (“BIF”), depression, and developmental delay.” Doc.

No. 4 at 19 (citing § 416.924(c)). Because the conditions in step one and two were met, the ALJ proceeded to the third and final step in the claims process—determining whether K.H. had an impairment that medically or functionally equaled the Social Security disability listings. See § 416.924(d). An ALJ may find an individual under the age of 18 disabled only upon a finding that the individual has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that meets, medically equals, or functionally equals a listed impairment.

Id. In order to determine whether the impairments of an individual under the age of 18 functionally equal a listed impairment, the ALJ evaluates the claimant’s functional limitations in each of six domains: (1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending and completing tasks; (3)

interacting and relating with others; (4) moving about and manipulating objects; (5) caring for yourself; and (6) health and physical well-being.

20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1)(i)–(vi). The ALJ assesses what the claimant cannot do, has difficulty doing, needs help doing, or is restricted from doing because of the impairments, assessing the interactive and cumulative effects of all the impairments, including those which are not severe. § 416.926a(a). An individual under the age of 18 is disabled if he has an impairment or impairments of “listing-level severity” that result in an “extreme” limitation in one domain or “marked” limitations in two or more domains.

Id. A “marked” limitation in a domain is found when an impairment interferes “seriously” with the individual’s ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. § 416.926a(e)(2). Put another way, a “marked” limitation is a limitation that is “more than moderate” but “less than extreme.” Id. An “extreme” limitation in a domain is found when the impairment interferes “very seriously” with the individual’s ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. § 416.926a(e)(3).

III. LEGAL STANDARD A district court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is limited; the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld “if the ALJ applied correct legal standards and if the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.” *Drumgold v. Comm’r of Soc.*

Sec., 144 F.4th 596, 604 (4th Cir. 2025). “[T]he threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence... is more than a mere scintilla.² It means—and means only—such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” *Biestek v. Berryhill*, 587 U.S. 97, 102–03 (2019) (citation modified).

Accordingly, this Court does not review a final decision of the Commissioner de novo, *Metcalf v. Schweiker*, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986), and must affirm the Social Security Administration’s disability determination “when [the] ALJ has applied correct legal standards and the ALJ’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.” *Drumgold*, 144 F.4th at 604; see also *Hays v. Sullivan*, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir.

1990); *Johnson v. Barnhart*, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Where conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [ALJ].”). ² As the Fourth Circuit has noted, “[s]tandards are easy to recite, but harder to apply. Part of that difficulty... lies with confusing terminology like ‘a scintilla of evidence.’ After all, what in the world is a ‘scintilla?’...

[D]ating back to the nineteenth century, courts have struggled with the ‘distinction between what is a scintilla’ and what is not.” *Boing v. Raleigh & G.R. Co.*, 87 N.C. 360 (N.C. 1882) (remarking that the distinction “is so narrow that it is often very difficult for a court to decide upon which side

of the line evidence falls”). Recognizing this difficulty, current South Carolina Supreme Court Justice John C. Few once remarked, in jest, that “scintilla is Latin for ‘whatever a judge wants it to mean.’...”

To overcome the vagaries inherent in the term ‘scintilla,’ courts should not only recite our well-settled standards... but also actively engage with the [relevant underlying evidence] in analyzing the arguments of the parties.” *Sedar v. Reston Town Ctr. Prop., LLC*, 988 F.3d 756 (4th Cir. 2021). “In reviewing for substantial evidence” in support of an ALJ’s factual findings, “[the reviewing court] do[es] not undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [ALJ].” *Hancock v. Astrue*, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir.

2012) (citation modified). Rather, “[w]here conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled,” the court defers to the ALJ’s decision. *Id.* (citation modified); *Shinaberry v. Saul*, 952 F.3d 113, 123 (4th Cir. 2020). This is true even if the reviewing court disagrees with the outcome—so long as there is “substantial evidence” in the record to support the final decision.

Lester v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 838, 841 (4th Cir. 1982). However, notwithstanding this limited standard of review of the Commissioner’s factual determinations, the Court must always ensure that proper legal standards are being followed. *Long v. Kijakazi*, No. 1:22-CV-00091-KDB, 2022 WL 18026331, at *2–3 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 30, 2022). IV. DISCUSSION Plaintiff urges the Court to reverse the ALJ’s finding of no disability to remand the matter for a new hearing, contending that the ALJ erred by “failing to properly evaluate the claimant’s claim at Step 3 of the SEP regarding functional equivalence.” Doc.

No. 9 at 4. More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ erred by finding less than marked limitations in two of the six functional domains: “attending and completing tasks” and “acquiring and using information.” See Doc. No. 9. Importantly, for a minor child to be classified as disabled, he must have a marked limitation in at least two domains or an extreme limitation in at least one domain.³ § 416.926a(a).

³ Plaintiff alleges that, despite evidence of “significant limitations” in two domains— attending and completing tasks and acquiring and using information” the ALJ [erroneously] did not find that K.H. had marked limitations” in either. Doc. No. 9 at 5. Notably, Plaintiff does not contend that either limitation should have been rated as more than marked; in other words, Plaintiff does not assert that K.H. has any extreme limitations.

In the “attending and completing tasks” domain, the ALJ considers “how well adolescents are able to focus and maintain attention, and how well they begin, carry through, and finish activities, including the pace at which activities are performed and the ease with which they change them.”

Title XVI: Determining Childhood Disability-the Functional Equivalence Domain of “Attending & Completing Tasks”, SSR 09-4P (Feb.

18, 2009); see also § 416.926a(h). Limitations in this domain include being easily startled or overly reactive to sensory input; difficulty sustaining focus or completing activities of interest; becoming repeatedly sidetracked or frequently interrupting others; becoming easily frustrated and abandoning tasks the child is capable of completing; or requiring extra supervision to remain engaged in an activity. § 416.926a(h)(3).

However, the mere presence of such limitations does not necessarily equate to a marked or severe limitation. *Id.* After reviewing the record, the ALJ found that K.H. had a less than marked limitation in attending and completing tasks because, although the record reflected some difficulties with attention, motivation, and distractibility, the overall evidence did not demonstrate limitations of a marked severity.

Doc. No. 4 at 26–27. The ALJ explained that, notwithstanding the limitations identified, multiple educators also noted that K.H. completed assignments, participated in class, asked questions, and worked to the best of his ability, and several teachers denied problems such as restlessness, hyperactivity, impulsivity, or failure to finish tasks. *Id.* During a neuropsychological evaluation (and consistent with his ADHD diagnosis), K.H. had some difficulty with attention to task and impulsivity.

However, although the neuropsychological testing revealed a variety of deficits, K.H.’s NEPSY II scores in attention, executive functioning, and impulse control—which relate to this domain—fell largely within the low-average range. *Id.* The ALJ also noted that K.H. received only conservative treatment for ADHD, consisting of low doses of medication managed by K.H.’s primary care provider, and there were periods during which he stopped medication entirely.

Id. Moreover, treatment notes consistently described his ADHD symptoms as “moderate,” and his grades improved while on stimulant therapy, despite K.H.’s reports that he didn’t feel like the medication was working. *Id.* See also Doc. No. 9 at 6.

The ALJ further noted Plaintiff’s reports that K.H. could engage in daily activities such as completing chores, preparing simple meals, caring for the family’s dogs, and playing video games, all of which he found to be inconsistent with marked limitations in sustaining attention or completing tasks. *Id.* at 27.

Therefore, after considering K.H.’s ADHD and other impairments for which he received special education and other accommodations, as well as the neuropsychological testing results, K.H.’s medical treatment history, school performance, and daily activities, the ALJ concluded that K.H. did not have a marked limitation in attending and completing tasks. Put simply, the ALJ balanced

the conflicting evidence in the record to reach a conclusion that a reasonable mind could accept as sufficient.

See *Biestek*, 587 U.S. at 103. Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ supported his decision with substantial evidence, and the Court may not reweigh that evidence or substitute its judgment for his absent clear error. See *Hancock*, 667 F.3d at 472; *Lester*, 683 F.2d at 841; see also *Drumgold v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.*, 144 F.4th 596, 605 (4th Cir. 2025) (explaining that because the ALJ is the trier of fact, it is his role to resolve conflicting medical evidence, and when he does so by applying the proper factors, the Court will not “Monday- morning quarterback” the decision absent an exceptionally clear error).

No such error is present here. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s appeal will be denied, and the Commissioner’s decision will be affirmed.’ V. ORDER NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED THAT: 1. Defendant’s Motion to Affirm the Commissioner’s Decision (Doc. No. 11) is GRANTED; 2. Plaintiffs Social Security Appeal (Doc. No. 9) is DENIED; 3.

The Commissioner’s Decision is AFFIRMED; and 4. The Clerk is directed to close this matter in accordance with this Order. SO ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED. Signed: March 26, 2026 Kenneth D. Bell United States District Judge woe * Because two marked limitations must be present for a finding of disability, and Plaintiff does not allege that K.H. has any extreme limitations, the Court need not discuss the acquiring and using information domain and reaches no conclusions as to that domain.