

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA

Andrew Boodoo v. AMP Home Care LLC, doing business as AMP

Boodoo v. AMP · No. Civil Action No. 24-1056 · Decided May 11, 2026

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania resolves the parties’ motions in limine in an employment-discrimination, sexual-harassment, accommodation, and retaliation action. The court grants Plaintiff’s motions to exclude evidence concerning his withdrawn APSA claim, related complaints, other lawsuits, and separation from another employer, while denying Defendant’s motions to exclude evidence concerning Butler’s personal and third-party sexual conduct.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Nora Barry Fischer
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
DECIDED	May 11, 2026
DOCKET	Civil Action No. 24-1056
DISPOSITION	other
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	The parties filed competing motions in limine before trial in Plaintiff's Title VII and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act employment-discrimination action. After briefing and oral argument, the court ruled on the admissibility of challenged categories of evidence.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	Under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402, evidence is relevant and generally admissible if it has any tendency to make a consequential fact more or less probable. Under Rule 403, relevant evidence may be excluded when its probative value is substantially outweighed by dangers including unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	Unknown
PARTIES	Andrew Boodoo v. AMP Home Care LLC, doing business as AMP

TOPICS

employment discrimination

title vii

sexual harassment

motion in limine

evidence

PRACTICE AREAS

employment law

employment discrimination

evidence

civil procedure

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether evidence concerning Boodoo's withdrawn APSA retaliation claim and complaints about abuse or neglect at AMP was relevant and admissible at trial.
2. Whether evidence concerning Boodoo's EEOC proceedings, other lawsuits, and separation from another employer should be excluded under Rules 401 and 403.
3. Whether evidence of Butler's personal workplace conduct, including alleged intoxication, policy violations, and treatment of clients, was relevant to pretext or comparator evidence and should be admitted.
4. Whether evidence of Butler's sexual conduct with third parties was relevant to Boodoo's sexual-harassment claims and to proving pretext through evidence of workplace culture.

HOLDINGS

1. Because Boodoo withdrew his APSA retaliation claim and no remaining claim placed his complaints about abuse or neglect at issue, evidence of those complaints, whether made during or after employment, was irrelevant and was excluded under Rules 401 and 403.
2. Evidence concerning Boodoo's EEOC proceedings, lawsuits against other entities, and separation from another employer was excluded because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of confusing the issues, misleading the jury, and prompting a prejudicial conclusion that Boodoo was litigious.
3. Evidence of Butler's workplace conduct, including alleged intoxication, policy violations, theft, and treatment of residents, was relevant to pretext and comparator evidence and was not shown to be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or confusion; AMP's motion to exclude it was denied.
4. Evidence of Butler's sexual conduct with third parties that was tolerated by AMP was relevant to Boodoo's sexual-harassment claims and to pretext because evidence of an employer's discriminatory workplace culture may provide circumstantial evidence of discrimination; AMP's motion to exclude it was denied.

KEY QUOTATIONS

“Evidence is “relevant” if it has any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” (Opinion section III)

“That is, evidence of an employer’s culture may provide circumstantial evidence of discrimination.” (Opinion section IV.B.2)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Boodoo worked for AMP as a Team Lead from December 2023 until his termination in February 2024. He alleged that coworker and supervisor Tarashae Butler subjected him to sexual harassment and that AMP failed to respond adequately to his complaints. The termination followed Boodoo's departure shortly after midnight from a shift, after he had informed Butler and management that religious obligations prevented him from working an additional overnight shift; AMP characterized the departure as neglect because two residents were briefly left without staff. Boodoo identified his religion as Santeria and asserted that the challenged evidence concerning Butler's conduct was relevant to pretext, comparator evidence, and his sexual-harassment claims.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Boodoo sued AMP alleging religious discrimination, failure to accommodate, sexual harassment, and retaliation under Title VII and the PHRA. The court had previously denied AMP's motion for summary judgment. Before trial, Boodoo filed motions seeking to exclude evidence concerning his withdrawn Adult Protective Services Act claim, post-termination complaints, other lawsuits and employment separation; AMP filed motions seeking to exclude evidence concerning Tarashae Butler's personal and sexual conduct. The court granted Boodoo's motions and denied AMP's motions in limine.

DISPOSITION

other

CASES CITED

- Gibson v. Mayor & Council of Wilmington, 355 F.3d at 215, 232 (3d Cir. 2004)
- Blancha v. Raymark Industries, 972 F.2d 507, 514 (3d Cir. 1992)
- Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 972 (3d Cir. 1980)
- Pleasants v. Allbaugh, 285 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2003)
- Snyder v. Pascack Valley Hosp., 303 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2002)
- Allen v. Peake, No. 08cv1055, 2009 WL 1362635, at *1 (W.D. Pa. May 14, 2009)
- Moore v. University of Pittsburgh, Civil Action No. 02-1734, 2005 WL 8165154, at **1-2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2005)
- Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1302 (3d Cir. 1996)
- Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 546 (3d Cir. 1992)