

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
VIRGINIA, RICHMOND DIVISION

Jimante Taylor v. Sgt. Lockhart

No. 3:25CV507 (RCY), United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division
(April 13, 2026)

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed Jimante Taylor’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Sgt. Lockhart under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The court held that Taylor failed to plausibly allege deliberate indifference to a serious medical need or a cognizable claim based on an alleged threat to remove him from an institutional program.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Roderick C. Young
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division
DECIDED	April 13, 2026
DOCKET	3:25CV507 (RCY)
DISPOSITION	dismissed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	A Virginia inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court screened the particularized complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A and dismissed the action for failure to state a claim and because it was legally frivolous.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	On preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, the court applied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, accepting well-pleaded factual allegations as true and viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, while disregarding conclusory allegations and determining whether the complaint plausibly alleged all elements of a claim.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	unpublished district court memorandum opinion

PARTIES

Jimante Taylor v. Sgt. Lockhart

TOPICS

prisoners rights

section 1983

due process

fourteenth amendment

motions to dismiss

PRACTICE AREAS

civil rights

constitutional law

prisoner litigation

medical care

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Taylor plausibly alleged that Sgt. Lockhart was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Whether Sgt. Lockhart's alleged threat to charge inmates and remove them from the RISE Program stated a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
3. Whether the particularized complaint was subject to dismissal as frivolous or for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.

HOLDINGS

1. Taylor failed to state a viable Fourteenth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim because he did not adequately allege a medical condition posing a substantial risk of serious harm or a constitutionally significant injury resulting from Sgt. Lockhart's conduct.
2. The alleged threat to remove Taylor from the RISE Program and charge inmates who received negative COVID-19 tests did not state a cognizable claim under § 1983 because mere threats or verbal abuse, without more, are insufficient.
3. The action was subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A because the claims were legally frivolous and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

KEY QUOTATIONS

“To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a medical need, the specific type of deliberate indifference claim at issue in this case, a pretrial detainee must plead that (1) they had a medical condition or injury that posed a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or failed to act to appropriately address the risk that the condition posed; (3) the defendant knew or should have known (a) that the detainee had that condition and (b) that the defendant’s action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm; and (4) as a result, the detainee was harmed.”

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In February 2025, Taylor was incarcerated and enrolled in the RISE Program at a regional jail. During a COVID-19 outbreak in his housing pod, he reported feeling sick and losing his sense of taste and smell, and he requested a COVID-19 test. Taylor alleged that Sgt. Lockhart stated that inmates receiving negative tests would be charged

and removed from the RISE Program, and that Taylor thereafter continued feeling sick without receiving treatment.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The court directed Taylor to file a particularized complaint because the original allegations did not provide fair notice of the facts and law supporting liability. Taylor filed a particularized complaint naming Sgt. Lockhart as the sole defendant. Upon statutory preliminary review, the court dismissed the claims and directed the Clerk to record the disposition for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

DISPOSITION

dismissed

CASES CITED

- Clay v. Yates, 809 F. Supp. 417, 427 (E.D. Va. 1992)
- Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324, 327 (1989)
- Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992)
- Mylan Lab’ys, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 556, 570 (2007)
- Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)
- Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003)
- Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002)
- Iodice v. United States, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)
- Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978)
- Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring)
- Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)
- Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)
- Moss v. Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 624 (4th Cir. 2021)
- Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988)
- Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 604-05, 608-09, 611 (4th Cir. 2023)
- Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015)
- Wingfield v. Henrico Reg’l Jail E., No. 3:25CV171 (DJN), 2025 WL 3209668, at *5 (E.D. Va. Nov. 17, 2025)
- Harvey v. Mahon, No. Civ. A. 7:02cv00829, 2004 WL 3334794, at *6 (W.D. Va. Aug. 30, 2004)
- Brown v. Wagner, No. 8:24-cv-07076-BHH-KFM, 2024 WL 5315321, at *4 (D.S.C. Dec. 13, 2024)
- Cooper v. Casey, 97 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 1996)
- Wilson v. McKeller, 254 F. App’x 960, 961 (4th Cir. 2007)

OPINION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division JIMANTE TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 3:25CV507 (RCY) SGT.
LOCKHART, Defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Jimante Taylor, a Virginia inmate
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.¹ The matter is before
the Court for evaluation of the Particularized Complaint (ECF No. 8) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2) and 1915A.² For the reasons set forth below, the action will be DISMISSED for failure
to state a claim and because it is legally frivolous.

I. PRELIMINARY REVIEW Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) this Court
must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) “is frivolous” or
(2) “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see 28 U.S.C. §
1915A.

The first standard includes claims based upon “an indisputably meritless legal theory,” or claims
where the 1 The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Every person who, under color of
any statute... of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law....

42 U.S.C. § 1983. 2 The Court employs the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF docketing
system. The Court corrects the spelling, punctuation, and capitalization in the quotations from
Taylor’s submissions. “factual contentions are clearly baseless.” *Clay v. Yates*, 809 F. Supp. 417,
427 (E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).

The second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). “A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint;
importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses.” *Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin*, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.

1992) (citing 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, *Federal Practice and Procedure* § 1356
(1990)). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff’s well-pleaded
allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Mylan Lab’ys, Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also *Martin*, 980 F.2d at 952.

This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and “a court considering a motion to
dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 679
(2009).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “require[] only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what

the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” *Id.* (citations omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” *id.* (citation omitted), stating a claim that is “plausible on its face,” *id.* at 570, rather than merely “conceivable.” *Id.* “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing *Bell Atl.*

Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, therefore, the plaintiff must “allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim.” *Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.*, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing *Dickson v. Microsoft Corp.*, 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); *Iodice v. United States*, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir.

2002)). Lastly, while the Court liberally construes pro se complaints, *Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate’s advocate, sua sponte developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. See *Brock v. Carroll*, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); *Beaudett v. City of Hampton*, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir.

1985). II. ALLEGATIONS The Court directed Taylor to particularize his complaint because his allegations failed to provide each defendant with fair notice of the facts and law upon which his or her liability rests. See Order, ECF No. 7. Nevertheless, as recounted below, in the Particularized Complaint, Taylor fails to state a viable claim.

In his Particularized Complaint, Taylor lists Sgt. Lockhart as the only Defendant. Compl. 1, ECF No. 8. Taylor then provides the following allegations to support his claim: In February of 2025, I was enrolled in the RISE Program. There was a Covid-19 outbreak in Pod 5A of the RISE Program. I began feeling sick and lost my sense of taste and smell. I asked if it was possible to see the nurse to receive a Covid-19 test.

In asking the deputy on duty informed Sgt. Lockhart that several of us inmates were requesting Covid-19 testing to be administered on us. A lot of us, including myself, had multiple Covid-19 symptoms. Sgt. Lockhart came into the Pod(5A) and stated anyone who took a Covid test and it was negative would receive a charge and be removed from the RISE Program. I continued to feel sick and never received treatment.

Id. at 4. III. ANALYSIS It is both unnecessary and inappropriate to engage in an extended discussion of the lack of merit of Taylor’s theories for relief. See *Cochran v. Morris*, 73 F.3d 1310,

1315 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing that “abbreviated treatment” is consistent with Congress’s vision for the disposition of frivolous or “insubstantial claims” (citing *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989))).

To state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of either a constitutional right or a right conferred by a law of the United States. See *Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley*, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Because Taylor was incarcerated at a regional jail at the time of the events described in the Particularized Complaint, he was likely a pretrial detainee. Consequently, the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment, governs his claims. *Moss v. Harwood*, 19 F.4th 614, 624 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing *Martin v. Gentile*, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988)).

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects pretrial detainees from ‘governmental action’ that is not ‘rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose’ or that is ‘excessive in relation to that purpose.’” *Short v. Hartman*, 87 F. 4th 593, 608–09 (4th Cir. 2023) (citing *Kingsley v. Hendrickson*, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015)). A pretrial detainee may “state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, based on a purely objective standard, for prison officials’ deliberate indifference to excessive risks of harm.” *Id.* at 604–05.

The Fourth Circuit has stated that: To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a medical need, the specific type of deliberate indifference claim at issue in this case, a pretrial detainee must plead that (1) they had a medical condition or injury that posed a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or failed to act to appropriately address the risk that the condition posed; (3) the defendant knew or should have known (a) that the detainee had that condition and (b) that the defendant’s action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm; and (4) as a result, the detainee was harmed.

Short, 87 F.4th at 611. Taylor fails to satisfy these factors. See *Wingfield v. Henrico Reg’l Jail E.*, No. 3:25CV171 (DJN), 2025 WL 3209668, at *5 (E.D. Va. Nov. 17, 2025) (dismissing similar claim). First, although the Particularized Complaint suggests that Taylor exhibited “multiple symptoms” of COVID-19, Taylor only identifies generally feeling sick and that he lost his sense of taste and smell.

Beyond this, he identifies no COVID-specific symptoms and their accompanying severity, nor does he allege that he was at a higher-than-average risk of health complications from contracting the virus. These allegations are insufficient to state a claim. See *Harvey v. Mahon*, No. Civ. A. 7:02cv00829, 2004 WL 3334794, at *6 (W.D. Va. Aug. 30, 2004) (granting motion to dismiss as to claim where plaintiff “[did] not allege any specific facts concerning the symptoms or effects” of a condition he purported to suffer while incarcerated).

Second, the Particularized Complaint does not suggest that Taylor actually suffered any constitutionally significant injury because of Sgt. Lockhart's conduct. See *Wingfield*, 2025 WL 3209668, at *5 (citing *Brown v. Wagner*, No. 8:24-cv-07076-BHH-KFM, 2024 WL 5315321, at *4 (D.S.C. Dec. 13, 2024), R&R adopted, 2025 WL 55043 (D.S.C. Jan. 9, 2025) (E.D. Va. Nov.

17, 2025) (dismissing similar claim). Cf. *Cooper v. Casey*, 97 F.3d 914, 916 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that “[a] prison’s medical staff that refuses to dispense bromides for the sniffles or minor aches and pains or a tiny scratch or a mild headache or minor fatigue—the sorts of ailments for which many people who are not in prison do not seek medical attention—does not by its refusal violate the Constitution”).

To the extent that Taylor seeks relief on the basis of Sergeant Lockhart's alleged threat to remove him from an institutional program (RISE), he is not entitled to such relief, as “mere threats or verbal abuse, without more, do not state a cognizable claim under § 1983.” *Wilson v. McKeller*, 254 F. App’x 960, 961 (4th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

Accordingly, Taylor’s claims will be DISMISSED. IV. CONCLUSION Taylor’s claims will be DISMISSED. The action will be DISMISSED. The Clerk will be DIRECTED to note the disposition of the action for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). An appropriate Final Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion. /s/ Roderick C. Young Date: April 13, 2026 United States District Judge Richmond, Virginia