

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH
CAROLINA

Calvin Williams v. Warden FCI Edgefield

Williams · No. 2:25-cv-07824-RMG · Decided January 26, 2026

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and granted Calvin Williams’s motion for voluntary dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition. The court denied the Warden’s motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment as moot after finding that Williams had received the requested relief concerning his residential reentry placement and application of First Step Act time credits.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the District of South Carolina
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Richard Mark Gergel
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the District of South Carolina
DECIDED	January 26, 2026
DOCKET	2:25-cv-07824-RMG
DISPOSITION	dismissed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Petitioner filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition challenging the Bureau of Prisons' application of First Step Act time credits. After Respondent moved to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment, Petitioner moved to dismiss, stating that the matter had been resolved. The Magistrate Judge recommended voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), and the District Court adopted that recommendation without objection.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	Because no specific objections were filed to the Report and Recommendation, the Court needed only to satisfy itself that there was no clear error on the face of the record before accepting the recommendation. The Court also stated that specific objections would require de novo review under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	Unknown
PARTIES	Calvin Williams v. Warden FCI Edgefield

TOPICS

federal habeas corpus

post-conviction relief

motions to dismiss

summary judgment

civil procedure

PRACTICE AREAS

federal habeas corpus

post-conviction relief

civil procedure

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Court should construe Petitioner's motion to dismiss as a motion for voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2).
2. Whether voluntary dismissal should be granted where Respondent consented and would not suffer substantial prejudice.
3. Whether Respondent's motion to dismiss or, alternatively, motion for summary judgment should be denied as moot after the petitioner's requested relief was provided.
4. What standard of review applies to an unobjected-to Report and Recommendation.

HOLDINGS

1. A petitioner's post-response request to dismiss an action is properly construed as a request for voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), which requires a court order after the opposing party has responded.
2. Voluntary dismissal should be granted where the opposing party consents and the record shows that dismissal will not cause substantial prejudice to that party.
3. Respondent's motion to dismiss or, alternatively, motion for summary judgment should be denied as moot when the petitioner has received the relief sought and the underlying habeas dispute has been voluntarily dismissed.
4. When no specific objections are filed to a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, the district court need only determine that no clear error appears on the face of the record before accepting the recommendation.

KEY QUOTATIONS

“Where the parties fail to file any specific objections, “a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.”” (at 2)

“The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge ably summarized the relevant factual and legal issues and correctly concluded that Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, properly construed as a motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2), should be granted” (at 3)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner, a federal prisoner housed at FCI Edgefield, challenged the Bureau of Prisons' application of First Step Act time credits and sought an earlier transfer to a residential reentry center or home confinement. After the petition and Respondent's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment were filed, Petitioner moved to dismiss because the matter had been resolved. Respondent reported that Petitioner had been transferred to the Salvation Army Correctional Southeast Residential Reentry Center in Chicago and had therefore received the relief requested.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition concerning his projected transfer to a residential reentry center and the application of First Step Act time credits. Respondent moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, and Petitioner later moved to dismiss because he had received the requested relief. Respondent consented to dismissal. The Magistrate Judge recommended granting voluntary dismissal and denying Respondent's motion as moot; the District Court adopted the R&R and entered the order.

DISPOSITION

dismissed

CASES CITED

- Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976)
- Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005)
- Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972)
- Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)
- Weller v. Department of Social Services for City of Baltimore, 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990)

OPINION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION Calvin Williams, Case No. 2:25-cv-07824-RMG Petitioner, v.
ORDER Warden FCI Edgefield, Respondent. This matter is before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of the Magistrate Judge, recommending that Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, which the Magistrate Judge construed as a motion for voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), be granted and that Respondent’s motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment be denied as moot.

(Dkt. No. 25). The Parties were given notice that they had 14 days from the date of the R&R to file any objection, which, with three additional days for mailing, required the filing of objections on or before January 23, 2026. Id. at 4.

The Court has received no objection. For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the R&R as the Order of the Court, grants Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, and denies as moot Respondent’s motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment.

I. Background At the time his petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed, Petitioner, proceeding pro se, was a federal prisoner housed at the Federal Correctional Institution in Edgefield, South Carolina. (Dkt. No. 1). Petitioner, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenges the Bureau of Prisons' ("BOP") application of time credits under the First Step Act ("FSA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A).

Id. Specifically, Petitioner takes issue with "the decision of the BOP not to transfer [him] into 1 [Residential Reentry Center ("RRC")] until 11-5-26 or home confinement when [his] unit team recommended 11-5-25[.]" Id. at 2. Petitioner further asserts that he was denied the full application of his FSA time credits toward his RRC date. Id. at 6.

For relief, Petitioner seeks to have his RRC transfer date moved from November 5, 2026, to November 5, 2025. Id. at 7. On November 21, 2025, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 19). Petitioner filed a response. (Dkt. No. 22).

On December 9, 2025, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, stating, "Petitioner Calvin Williams respectfully moves this Honorable Court to dismiss Williams[']s motion as the matter has been resolved." (Dkt. No. 23).

On December 16, 2025, Respondent filed a response consenting to Petitioner's motion to dismiss and noting that "Petitioner is at the Salvation Army Correctional SE RRC in Chicago, Illinois, which falls under the Chicago Residential Reentry Management Office ("RRM")." (Dkt. No. 24, at 1). Respondent further notes that "[i]nmates under RRM responsibility may be either in an RRC or on home confinement," so "Petitioner has received the relief requested." Id. at 1-2.

II. Legal Standard A. Magistrate's Report and Recommendation The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with this Court. See *Mathews v. Weber*, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). This Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the R&R to which specific objections are made.

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Additionally, the Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." Id. Where the parties fail to file any specific objections, "a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins.*

Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation and punctuation omitted). B. Pro Se Pleadings This Court liberally construes complaints filed by pro se litigants to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See *Cruz v. Beto*, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).

The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a viable federal claim, nor can the Court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. See *Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. for City of Balt.*, 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). III. Discussion The Magistrate Judge construed Petitioner's motion to dismiss as a motion for voluntary dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), which requires a court order to dismiss an action at the complainant's request after the opposing party has responded.

(Dkt. No. 25, at 2) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2)). Accordingly, upon reviewing the record and finding that no substantial prejudice would result to Respondent in light of its consent to Petitioner's voluntary dismissal, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Petitioner's motion to dismiss be granted and that Respondent's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment be denied as moot.

Id. at 2-3. The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge ably summarized the relevant factual and legal issues and correctly concluded that Petitioner's motion to dismiss, properly construed as a motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2), should be granted, that Respondent will not suffer 3 substantial prejudice if Petitioner's habeas petition is dismissed, and that Respondent's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment should be denied as moot.

IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS the R&R as the Order of the Court (Dkt. No. 25), GRANTS Petitioner's motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 23), and DENIES AS MOOT Respondent's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 19). AND IT IS SO ORDERED. s/ Richard Mark Gergel Richard Mark Gergel United States District Judge January 26, 2026 Charleston, South Carolina 4