

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION**

Charee L. Anderson-Taylor v. FEDS

Anderson-Taylor · No. No. 3:25-CV-2576-X-BW · Decided December 16, 2025

SUMMARY

A magistrate judge recommends dismissing Charee L. Anderson-Taylor’s pro se complaint against the federal government with prejudice as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The recommendation concludes that the complaint is unintelligible, alleges fanciful and incredible claims, and is additionally barred by sovereign immunity.

OPINION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION CHAREE L. ANDERSON-TAYLOR, § Plaintiff, § § v. § No. 3:25-CV-
2576-X-BW § FEDS, § Defendant. § Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge1 FINDINGS,
CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE
JUDGE Before the Court is Plaintiff Charee L. Anderson-Taylor’s Complaint, received on
September 23, 2025.

(Dkt. No. 3.) Based on the relevant filings and applicable law, the Court should DISMISS the complaint with prejudice as frivolous. I. BACKGROUND On September 23, 2025, Anderson-Taylor filed a pro se Complaint for a Civil Case that names “FEDS” as the defendant, which she later identifies as “Federal Government.” (See id. at 1, 3.) Her complaint is unintelligible, as her statement of a claim merely states, “Harassment; Blackballing; Entrapment.” (Id. at 4.)

As for relief, she seeks \$10,000 “for bills accumulating while they are hindering me from finding gainful employment.” (Id.) Anderson-Taylor filed a previous pro se action against “Federal Government—FEDS” in 2023, which was dismissed as frivolous. 1 By Special Order No. 3-251, this pro se case has been automatically referred for full case management. (See Dkt.

No. 1.) See Dkt. Nos. 1, 10, 11, 12, Charee L. Anderson-Taylor v. Federal Government, No. 3:23-CV-136-X-BT. II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS Because Anderson-Taylor has not paid the applicable filing fee and is seeking to proceed in forma pauperis in this action (see Dkt. No. 4.), her complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).2 That statute authorizes the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint if the Court finds that it is frivolous or malicious.

A complaint is frivolous when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or when its factual contentions are “clearly ‘baseless.’” *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992); see also *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

The latter category encompasses allegations that describe “fanciful, fantastic, and delusional” scenarios or that “rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” *Denton*, 504 U.S. at 33 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

The Court must always liberally construe pleadings filed by pro se litigants. See *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (noting pro se pleadings “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). Even under the most liberal construction, however, Anderson-Taylor’s three words fail to state a viable claim or 2 Although Anderson-Taylor moves to proceed in forma pauperis in this case, the responses in her application show that her monthly income exceeds her monthly expenses such that the application should be denied.

(See Dkt. No. 4.) The undersigned makes no recommendation on the motion at this time, however, in light of the recommended dismissal of this case on a different basis. anything that can be construed as such. Further, her allegations here—to the extent they are coherent—are fanciful and incredible, and thus, inadequate to support any cognizable claim. See *Denton*, 504 U.S. at 33.

Finally, even if Anderson-Taylor stated a coherent set of facts from which the Court could infer a cause of action, nothing suggests that the federal government’s sovereign immunity would have been waived as to such claims. See *Lynch v. U.S. Government*, No. 7:09-CV-130-O, 2009 WL 2949770, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2009). Dismissal is also appropriate for that reason.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Consequently, Anderson-Taylor’s complaint should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous. I. CONCLUSION The Court should DISMISS the Complaint, received on September 23, 2025 (Dkt. No. 3), with prejudice as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). SO RECOMMENDED on December 16, 2025. BRIA cKAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the manner provided by law.

Any party who objects to any part of this report and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection must identify the finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and indicate the place in the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is found.

An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from

appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error.

See *Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the time to file objections to 14 days).

Retrieved from lawtools.ai · <https://lawtools.ai/cases/state/united-states-district-court-for-the-northern-district-of-texas-dallas-division-united-states-distri/2025/charee-l-anderson-taylor-v-feds-6c41nljm>