

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION

Charee L. Anderson-Taylor v. FEDS

Anderson-Taylor · No. No. 3:25-CV-2576-X-BW · Decided December 16, 2025

SUMMARY

A magistrate judge recommends dismissing Charee L. Anderson-Taylor’s pro se complaint against the federal government with prejudice as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The recommendation concludes that the complaint is unintelligible, alleges fanciful and incredible claims, and is additionally barred by sovereign immunity.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Brian McKay
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division
DECIDED	December 16, 2025
DOCKET	No. 3:25-CV-2576-X-BW
DISPOSITION	other
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	A pro se plaintiff filed a civil complaint and sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The magistrate judge screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and recommended dismissal with prejudice as frivolous.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court may screen an in forma pauperis complaint and dismiss it sua sponte if it is frivolous or malicious. A complaint is frivolous when it rests on an indisputably meritless legal theory or contains clearly baseless factual allegations.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	nonprecedential
PARTIES	Charee L. Anderson-Taylor v. FEDS

TOPICS

- civil procedure
- pleadings
- motions to dismiss
- sovereign immunity
- government liability

PRACTICE AREAS

civil procedure

civil rights

constitutional law

federal courts

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the complaint should be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
2. Whether the complaint's allegations were sufficiently coherent and plausible to state a cognizable claim when liberally construed.
3. Whether sovereign immunity independently supported dismissal because no waiver by the federal government was apparent.

HOLDINGS

1. The complaint should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous because its allegations were unintelligible, failed to state a viable claim, and were fanciful and incredible.
2. Dismissal was also appropriate because the complaint did not identify any waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity.

KEY QUOTATIONS

“A complaint is frivolous when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or when its factual contentions are “clearly ‘baseless.’” (II)

“The latter category encompasses allegations that describe “fanciful, fantastic, and delusional” scenarios or that “rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” (II)

“Even under the most liberal construction, however, Anderson-Taylor’s three words fail to state a viable claim or anything that can be construed as such.” (II)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Anderson-Taylor filed a pro se complaint naming “FEDS,” which she later identified as the federal government. Her statement of the claim consisted only of the words “Harassment; Blackballing; Entrapment,” and she sought \$10,000 for bills allegedly accumulating because the government hindered her ability to find gainful employment. The court noted that she had previously filed a pro se action against the federal government that was dismissed as frivolous.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Anderson-Taylor filed the complaint on September 23, 2025, naming “FEDS,” later identified as the federal government, as defendant. The case was automatically referred to the magistrate judge for full case management. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal with prejudice under the in forma pauperis screening statute; the recommendation advised the parties of their right to object under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b).

DISPOSITION

other

CASES CITED

- Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992)
- Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)
- Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
- Lynch v. U.S. Government, No. 7:09-CV-130-O, 2009 WL 2949770, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2009)
- Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996), modified by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

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