

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
INDIANA, HAMMOND DIVISION

Reginald Ruffin v. Dyer Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC and
Dyer HC, LLC

Ruffin · No. 2:25-CV-37-TLS-JEM · Decided April 2, 2026

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana partially grants and partially denies defendants’ motion to dismiss claims in Reginald Ruffin’s amended complaint under Title VII. The court dismisses the duplicative hostile work environment claim but allows the retaliation, sexual harassment, and sex discrimination claims to proceed.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Theresa L. Springmann
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division
DECIDED	April 2, 2026
DOCKET	2:25-CV-37-TLS-JEM
DISPOSITION	other
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Title VII hostile work environment and sex discrimination claims as duplicative of the Title VII sexual harassment claim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and draws reasonable inferences in that party's favor. The complaint must contain enough factual matter to state a facially plausible claim for relief.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	unpublished district court opinion; persuasive authority only

TOPICS

- motions to dismiss
- title vii
- employment discrimination
- hostile work environment
- civil procedure

PRACTICE AREAS

employment law

civil rights

civil procedure

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Title VII hostile work environment claim was duplicative of the Title VII sexual harassment claim and should be dismissed.
2. Whether the Title VII sex discrimination claim was duplicative of the Title VII sexual harassment claim or adequately alleged a distinct claim based on disparate treatment after Plaintiff's complaint.

HOLDINGS

1. The hostile work environment claim was duplicative of the sexual harassment claim and was properly dismissed because Plaintiff did not oppose dismissal and the claims arose from the same allegations.
2. The sex discrimination claim was not duplicative of the sexual harassment claim and adequately stated a distinct Title VII claim because Plaintiff alleged that he suffered an adverse employment action because of his sex, including reduced hours and reassignment while the female manager who allegedly harassed him retained her position.

KEY QUOTATIONS

"Claims that involve the same operative facts and same injury, and that require proof of essentially the same elements." (Analysis)

"Accordingly, the Plaintiff has stated a distinct claim of sex discrimination, and the Court denies the motion to dismiss as to Count IV." (Analysis, Count IV)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Reginald Ruffin alleged that, while working as a dietary aide for Dyer Nursing and Dyer HC, a female manager sexually harassed him by pulling his head into her genital area. After Ruffin complained to human resources, the manager was temporarily removed but later returned to manage the kitchen. Ruffin alleged that management required him to move to a different shift or department and that he was moved to second shift with more than fifteen fewer hours per week, while the manager retained her position.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint asserting four Title VII claims: retaliation, sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and sex discrimination. Defendants moved to dismiss Counts III and IV as duplicative of Count II. The court granted the motion as to Count III, denied it as to Count IV, and allowed Counts I, II, and IV to proceed.

DISPOSITION

other

CASES CITED

- *Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc.*, 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014)
- *Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. v. Lease Resol. Corp.*, 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir. 1997)
- *Bell v. City of Chicago*, 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016)
- *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
- *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
- *Gunn v. Cont'l Cas. Co.*, 968 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2020)
- *Greene v. Ill. Sec'y of State*, 2025 WL 3268678, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2025)
- *Barrow v. Blouin*, 38 F. Supp. 3d 916, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
- *Roy v. Power Dry Chi. Inc.*, 2021 WL 3801817, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2021)
- *Brooks v. FedEx Supply Chain, Inc.*, 2019 WL 1746264, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2019)
- *Brownlee v. Cath. Charities of the Archdiocese of Chi.*, 2017 WL 770997, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2017)
- *Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.*, 852 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2017)
- *Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc.*, 758 F.3d 819, 827 (7th Cir. 2014)
- *Tamayo v. Blagojevich*, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008)
- *Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc.*, 23 F.4th 774, 777 (7th Cir. 2022)

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