

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

Stacy L. Boyd v. Coeur D’Alene School District #271, Erik Davis, and
Trent Derrick

Stacy L. Boyd v. Coeur D’Alene School District #271, Case No. 2:26-cv-00115-DCN (D. Idaho June 15, 2026) ·
No. 2:26-cv-00115-DCN · Decided June 15, 2026

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted defendants’ motion to dismiss Stacy L. Boyd’s claims alleging race discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Idaho Human Rights Act, as well as defamation claims against individual defendants. The court held that the discrimination allegations were insufficiently plausible and that the defamation claim was barred by the plaintiff’s failure to allege compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The court granted Boyd 30 days to file an amended complaint.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the District of Idaho
WRITING FOR THE COURT	David C. Nye
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the District of Idaho
DECIDED	June 15, 2026
DOCKET	2:26-cv-00115-DCN
DISPOSITION	dismissed
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Defendants moved to dismiss the removed complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), challenged standing, and argued that the defamation claim was barred by failure to comply with the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, but allowed Boyd thirty days to amend.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court assesses the legal sufficiency of the complaint, accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true, disregards unreasonable inferences and legal conclusions, and determines whether the nonconclusory factual allegations plausibly suggest entitlement to relief. Dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is beyond doubt that the complaint cannot be saved by amendment.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	nonprecedential

PARTIES

Stacy L. Boyd v. Coeur D’Alene School District #271, Erik Davis,
Trent Derrick

TOPICS

motions to dismiss

civil procedure

employment discrimination

racial discrimination

defamation

PRACTICE AREAS

civil procedure

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civil rights

torts

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Boyd had adequately alleged Article III standing for his discrimination theories concerning the investigation and selective enforcement of the conflict-of-interest policy.
2. Whether Boyd plausibly pleaded that the investigation, temporary coaching prohibition, or conflict-of-interest-policy enforcement occurred because of his race under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Idaho Human Rights Act.
3. Whether Boyd’s defamation claim was subject to dismissal because the complaint did not allege compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims Act notice requirement.
4. Whether the complaint should be dismissed with or without leave to amend.

HOLDINGS

1. Boyd provisionally established standing to pursue claims arising from the investigation and the alleged selective enforcement of the conflict-of-interest policy, although the court noted that an amended complaint would need to more specifically allege injury and redressability.
2. The complaint did not plausibly allege that the investigation or temporary prohibition from coaching would not have occurred but for Boyd’s race, and those theories were dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
3. The complaint did not plausibly allege that the School District enforced the conflict-of-interest policy against Boyd because of his race, and that theory was dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
4. The defamation claim was subject to dismissal because Boyd did not allege compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims Act’s notice requirement.
5. The complaint was dismissed with leave to amend because the court could not say that amendment would necessarily be futile.

KEY QUOTATIONS

“In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.”

“Asserting the investigation was discriminatory without explaining how it was discriminatory is nothing more than a restatement of the statutes’ elements.”

“Standing alone, the School District’s refusal to waive its conflict-of-interest policy for Boyd despite doing so for at least some white employees is insufficient to plausibly conclude Boyd’s race was a motivating factor in the School District’s decision.”

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Boyd, who is Black, was hired as head coach of the girls’ varsity basketball team at Coeur d’Alene High School. After a report of alleged sexual misconduct from more than twenty years earlier, School District employees Erik Davis and Trent Derrick investigated Boyd; the allegation was not substantiated, but Boyd was temporarily prohibited from coaching summer games. Boyd also alleged that the District selectively enforced a conflict-of-interest policy by revoking an offer to his son for an assistant-coach position while waiving the policy for white employees. He claimed the investigation and policy enforcement were racially discriminatory and that Davis and Derrick defamed him during the investigation.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Boyd filed the action in Idaho state court in January 2026. Defendants removed it to the United States District Court for the District of Idaho and moved to dismiss. The court granted the motion, dismissing the discrimination claims as insufficiently pleaded and the defamation claim for failure to allege compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims Act, while granting leave to amend.

DISPOSITION

dismissed

CASES CITED

- Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 2011)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 556, 570 (2007)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009)
- Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009)
- Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)
- Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007)
- Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 2009)
- Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 946 (9th Cir. 2011)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-62 (1992)
- Reclaim Idaho v. Denney, 497 P.3d 160, 172-73 (Idaho 2021)
- Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984)
- Higdon v. Mabus, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1212 (S.D. Cal. 2014)
- Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)
- Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 341 (2020)
- Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., Georgia, 590 U.S. 644, 656 (2020)

- *Lowe v. City of Monrovia*, 775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985), amended, 784 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1986)
- *Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co.*, 179 P.3d 1064, 1069 (Idaho 2008)
- *Hatheway v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Idaho*, 310 P.3d 315, 322 (Idaho 2013)
- *Sherer v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. No. 25*, 148 P.3d 1232, 1236 (Idaho 2006)
- *Rife v. Long*, 908 P.2d 143, 148 (Idaho 1995)
- *Bauer v. Minidoka Sch. Dist. No. 331*, 778 P.2d 336, 340 (Idaho 1989)
- *Blount v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC*, 982 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
- *Dodge v. Bonners Ferry Police Department*, 450 P.3d 298, 303-04 (Idaho 2019)
- *Cobbley v. City of Challis*, 59 P.3d 959, 962 (Idaho 2002)
- *McQuillen v. City of Ammon*, 747 P.2d 741, 744 (Idaho 1987)

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