

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
TEXAS, DALLAS DIVISION**

Kump v. Envoy Air Inc.

No. 3:25-cv-2937-B-BN (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2026) · No. 3:25-cv-2937-B-BN · Decided January 8, 2026

OPINION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION ROSELLE KUMP, § § Plaintiff, § § V. § No. 3:25-cv-2937-B-BN § ENVOY AIR INC., § § Defendant. § FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Plaintiff Roselle Kump filed a pro se complaint alleging claims for employment discrimination based on age and gender against her former employer.

See Dkt. No. 3. And Senior United States District Judge Jane J. Boyle referred the lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. Kump did not pay the filing fee or file a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). So the Court ordered Kump to file an IFP motion or pay the filing fee by December 1, 2025.

See Dkt. No. 4. And the Court warned Kump that failure to do so “subjects this lawsuit to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).” Id. at 4. It is now more than a month past the court-ordered deadline to file an IFP motion or pay the filing fee, but Kump has failed to comply with the Court’s order. And that order and all other orders and notices mailed from this Court were returned to sender.

See Dkt. Nos. 6-8. But Kump has not filed a change of address or otherwise contacted the Court. Considering this record, the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Discussion Rule 41(b) “authorizes the district court to dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute or comply with [a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or] a court order.” *Griggs v. S.G.E.*

Mgmt., L.L.C., 905 F.3d 835, 844 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing *McCullough v. Lynaugh*, 835 F.2d 1126, 1127 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)); accord *Nottingham v. Warden, Bill Clements Unit*, 837 F.3d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 2016) (failure to comply with a court order); *Rosin v. Thaler*, 450 F. App’x 383, 383-84 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (failure to prosecute); see also *Campbell v. Wilkinson*, 988 F.3d 798, 800-01 (5th Cir.

2021) (holding that the text of Rule 41(b) does not extend to a failure to comply with a court's local rule insofar as that violation does not also qualify as a failure to prosecute (discussing *Berry v. CIGNA/RSI-CIGNA*, 975 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1992))). This authority "flows from the court's inherent power to control its docket and prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases." *Boudwin v. Graystone Ins.*

Co., Ltd., 756 F.2d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing *Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.*, 370 U.S. 626 (1962)); see also *Lopez v. Ark. Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Although [Rule 41(b)] is phrased in terms of dismissal on the motion of the defendant, it is clear that the power is inherent in the court and may be exercised sua sponte whenever necessary to 'achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.'" (quoting *Link*, 370 U.S. at 631)); *Campbell*, 988 F.3d at 800 ("It is well established that Rule 41(b) permits dismissal not only on motion of the defendant, but also on the court's own motion." (citing *Morris v. Ocean Sys., Inc.*, 730 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir.

1984) (citing, in turn, *Link*, 370 U.S. at 631))). And the Court's authority under Rule 41(b) is not diluted by a party proceeding pro se, as "[t]he right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." *Wright v. LBA Hospitality*, 754 F. App'x 298, 300 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting *Hulsey v. Texas*, 929 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir.

1991) (quoting, in turn, *Birl v. Estelle*, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. Nov. 1981))). A Rule 41(b) dismissal may be with or without prejudice. See *Long v. Simmons*, 77 F.3d 878, 879-80 (5th Cir. 1996). Although "[l]esser sanctions such as fines or dismissal without prejudice are usually appropriate before dismissing with prejudice,... a Rule 41(b) dismissal is appropriate where there is 'a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff and when lesser sanctions would not serve the best interests of justice.'" *Nottingham*, 837 F.3d at 441 (quoting *Bryson v. United States*, 553 F.3d 402, 403 (5th Cir.

2008) (per curiam) (in turn quoting *Callip v. Harris Cnty. Child Welfare Dep't*, 757 F.2d 1513, 1521 (5th Cir. 1985))); see also *Long*, 77 F.3d at 880 (a dismissal with prejudice is appropriate only if the failure to comply with the court order was the result of purposeful delay or contumacious conduct and the imposition of lesser sanctions would be futile); cf. *Nottingham*, 837 F.3d at 442 (noting that "lesser sanctions" may "include assessments of fines, costs, or damages against the plaintiff, conditional dismissal, dismissal without prejudice, and explicit warnings" (quoting *Thrasher v. City of Amarillo*, 709 F.3d 509, 514 (5th Cir.

2013))). "When a dismissal is without prejudice but 'the applicable statute of limitations probably bars future litigation,'" that dismissal operates as – i.e., it is reviewed as – "a dismissal with prejudice." *Griggs*, 905 F.3d at 844 (quoting *Nottingham*, 837 F.3d at 441); see, e.g., *Wright*, 754 F. App'x at 300 (affirming dismissal under Rule 41(b) – potentially effectively with prejudice –

where “[t]he district court had warned Wright of the consequences and ‘allowed [her] a second chance at obtaining service’” but she “disregarded that clear and reasonable order”).

By not complying with the order to file an IFP motion or pay the filing fee and failing to provide a complete or updated address – in addition to leaving the impression that Kump no longer wishes to pursue these claims – Kump has prevented this action from proceeding and has thus failed to prosecute this lawsuit. A Rule 41(b) dismissal of this lawsuit without prejudice is therefore warranted under these circumstances.

Because the undersigned concludes that lesser sanctions would be futile, as the Court is not required to delay the disposition of this case until such time as Kump decides to obey the Court’s order or contact the Court, the Court should exercise its inherent power to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and sua sponte dismiss this action without prejudice under Rule 41(b).

Insofar as this dismissal may prejudice Kump, these findings, conclusions, and recommendation afford notice, and the opportunity to file objections (further explained below) affords an opportunity to respond, to explain why this case should not be dismissed for the reasons set out above. Cf. *Carver v. Atwood*, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’ More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.” (citations omitted)).

Recommendation The Court should dismiss this action without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy.

See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific.

Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See *Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assn.*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996). DATED: January 8, 2026 DAVID L. HORAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE -6-

