

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
KENTUCKY, OWENSBORO DIVISION

Salvador Olmos Meza v. Mike Lewis, et al.

Meza · No. 4:25-cv-171-RGJ · Decided January 13, 2026

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky grants Salvador Olmos Meza’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his immigration detention. The court holds that Meza, who had lived in the United States for more than twenty years and was arrested under a Form I-200, was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 rather than the mandatory-detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and was therefore entitled to a bond hearing. The court also concludes that it has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and waives exhaustion.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, Owensboro Division
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, Owensboro Division
DECIDED	January 13, 2026
DOCKET	4:25-cv-171-RGJ
DISPOSITION	writ_granted
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the statutory and constitutional validity of immigration detention.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	The court reviewed its jurisdiction de novo as a question of law and reviewed the legality of detention under the Constitution and federal immigration statutes. For the due-process claim, the court applied the three-factor balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	nonprecedential district court memorandum opinion and order
PARTIES	Salvador Olmos Meza v. Mike Lewis, et al.

TOPICS

- immigration detention
- procedural due process
- removal proceedings
- statutory interpretation
- due process

PRACTICE AREAS

immigration law

habeas corpus

constitutional law

administrative law

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) or § 1252(g) barred district-court habeas jurisdiction over Meza's challenge to the legality of his immigration detention.
2. Whether Meza, a noncitizen who had been present in the United States for approximately twenty-five years and was arrested under a Form I-200 warrant, was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) or detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
3. Whether Meza's continued detention without a bond hearing violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and the INA.
4. Whether the proper remedy was release and a bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge.

HOLDINGS

1. Sections 1252(b)(9) and 1252(g) do not bar district-court jurisdiction over a habeas petition challenging the statutory and constitutional validity of immigration detention rather than the removal order, the decision to seek removal, or the process for determining removability.
2. Section 1226, not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs the detention of a noncitizen who has been present in the United States for many years, is not presently seeking admission at the border, and was arrested pursuant to a Form I-200 warrant.
3. Meza's continued detention without an individualized bond hearing violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and the INA.
4. The proper remedy was release from the unlawful detention and a bond hearing on the merits before a neutral immigration judge before any redetention.

KEY QUOTATIONS

"A claim of unlawful detention does not arise from the commencement of removal proceedings 'within the meaning of § 1252(g) simply because the claim[] relate[s] to that discretionary, prosecutorial decision.'"

"The Court finds it difficult to read a noncitizen who is "seeking admission" when the individual never attempted to "seek" admission pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2)(A)."

"The current detention of Meza is in violation of the Due Process Clause and the INA."

"The United States must provide Meza with a neutral bond hearing before an IJ."

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Salvador Olmos Meza, a Mexican citizen, had lived in the United States since 2000 after entering without inspection or admission. He was arrested in Illinois on October 24, 2025, pursuant to a Form I-200 warrant, transferred to the Hopkins County Jail, and served with a Form I-862 Notice to Appear. Despite the Form I-200's authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, ICE did not provide him a bond hearing and instead relied on interim guidance

treating certain noncitizens as subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. Meza was married, had a U.S.-citizen child, and was the primary financial support for his family.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Meza filed a habeas petition after ICE detained him pursuant to a Form I-200 warrant and did not provide a bond hearing. The United States opposed the petition, arguing that Meza was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 rather than discretionary detention under § 1226 and that the court lacked jurisdiction. The parties agreed that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary. The court granted the petition, ordered Meza released, and required a bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge before any redetention.

DISPOSITION

writ_granted

REMAND INSTRUCTIONS

The United States must release Meza because of the unlawful detention, provide him a bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge pursuant to § 1226 before any redetention, and certify compliance on the docket by January 15, 2026.

CASES CITED

- *Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)
- *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 688, 690 (2001)
- *DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.*, 591 U.S. 1, 19, 22 (2020)
- *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 288-89, 294-95, 301-03 (2018)
- *Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999)
- *Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigam*, 591 U.S. 103, 107-09 (2020)
- *In re Vill. Apothecary, Inc.*, 45 F.4th 940, 947 (6th Cir. 2022)
- *Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc.*, 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012)
- *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 400, 413 (2024)
- *TRW Inc. v. Andrews*, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)
- *United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc.*, 599 U.S. 419, 432 (2023)
- *Dubin v. United States*, 599 U.S. 110, 118, 120-21 (2023)
- *Yates v. United States*, 574 U.S. 528, 552 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring)
- *Stone v. I.N.S.*, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995)
- *United States v. Taylor*, 596 U.S. 845, 857 (2022)
- *Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.*, 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995)
- *Corley v. United States*, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009)
- *Torres v. Lynch*, 578 U.S. 452, 472 (2016)
- *Castañon-Nava v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.*, 161 F.4th 1048, 1061-62 (7th Cir. 2025)

- Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 222 (D. Mass. 2025)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)
- Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)
- A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025)
- Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2024)

OPINION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY OWENSBORO DIVISION SALVADOR OLMOS MEZA, Petitioner, v. Civil Action No. 4:25-cv-171-RGJ MIKE LEWIS, et. al., Respondents. * * * * * MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Salvador Olmos Meza’s Writ of Habeas Corpus. [DE 1]. Respondents responded on December 12, 2025, and filed additional documents on January 8, 2026.

[DE 7; DE 16]. The Parties agreed that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary. [DE 8; DE 10]. This matter is ripe for adjudication. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Meza’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus [DE 1].

I. Background Petitioner Salvador Olmos Meza, (“Meza”) is a native and citizen of Mexico. [DE 1 at 12]. Meza has been present in the United States since 2000 when he entered without inspection or admission into the United States. [Id.].¹ He was married in 2007. [Id.]. Meza is also a father to a U.S. citizen, and the primary financial support for his family.

[Id.]. On October 24, 2025, Meza was entering his vehicle in a Menards’s parking lot in Morton Grove, Illinois. [DE 1 at 12]. Then, four individuals, two who were masked, approached Meza. [Id.]. The individuals “did not identify themselves or explain the reason” why they approached Meza. [Id.]. Meza was subsequently handcuffed, arrested pursuant to a Form I-200, placed in a 1 The United States stipulates that Meza entered without inspection.

[DE 7 at 45 (“Meza is a citizen of vehicle, and eventually transferred to Hopkins County Jail. [Id.]. Two days later, Meza was issued a Form I-862 Notice to Appear. [DE 7 at 46]. Despite being arrested pursuant to a Form I-200 under the authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1226, Meza has not been offered a bond hearing. ICE contends that based on interim guidance from DHS, issued July 8, 2025, titled “Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,” only those noncitizens who have already been admitted into the United States are eligible to be released during removal proceedings and all other noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention, under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (“Section 1225”), not Section 1226.

[DE 1 at 12-13]. This is a reversal of ICE’s longstanding policy. [Id.]. Meza asserts that the United States illegally detained him under Section 1225 instead of Section 1226 in violation of the INA

and its implementing regulations. [Id. at 13]. And that this detention is in violation of his Due Process Rights under the Fifth Amendment. [Id. at 13-14].

Therefore, Meza seeks release from his detention, or in the alternative, to hold a bond hearing before a neutral IJ to determine whether he should remain in custody. [Id. at 14]. Meza alternatively asserts that the United States is judicially estopped from contending that Meza is subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225 based upon prior litigation.

[Id.]. In response, the United States makes three contentions. First, the Court does not have jurisdiction to review Meza's habeas petition. [DE 7 at 45]. Second, Meza is properly detained pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2), not Section 1226. [DE 7 at 46]. And third, Meza should not be released prior to a bond hearing. [DE 7 at 63]. 2 A Form I-200 derives its authority from Section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and its implementing Regulations, which correspond to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and 8 C.F.R. § 236.

Pursuant to Section 1226, noncitizens have a right to a custody determination reviewed by an Immigration Judge ("IJ"). See 8 II. Jurisdiction District courts have jurisdiction only where Congress has provided. *Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.*, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

The limits of this Court's jurisdiction are "not to be expanded by judicial decree." *Id.* A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to any person who demonstrates he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

Although the Court "may not review discretionary decisions made by immigration authorities, it may review immigration-related detentions to determine if they comport with the demands of the Constitution." *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001).

The United States claims that § 1252(b)(9) requires the Court to answer questions "arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove" Meza. [DE 7 at 46 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9))].³ Meza states that he is not challenging his removal proceedings but instead is solely challenging his "detention." [DE 1 at 16].

In *DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.*, 591 U.S. 1, 19 (2020), the Supreme Court held that § 1252(b)(9) "'does not present a jurisdictional bar' where those bringing suit 'are not asking for review of an order of removal,' 'the decision... to seek removal,' or 'the process by which... removability will be determined'" (quoting *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, 583 U.S. 281, 294-95 (2018)).

The Supreme Court has rejected that Section 1252(g) is similarly narrow. That provision limits review of cases "arising from" decisions "to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

The Supreme Court rejected the suggestion that 3 Despite numerous decisions to the contrary in this District and across the country, the United States continues to assert that this Court does not

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) or 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

The Court has located no decision to the contrary and the United States cites none. This Court has previously cited numerous decisions from around the country finding jurisdiction proper. See *Edahi v. Lewis, et al.* No. 4:25-CV-129-RGJ, 2025 WL 3466682, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 27, 2025). Further, in the United States brief at the Sixth Circuit on a similar 1225/1226 issue, the United States asserts that the “district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2241.” Brief for Respondent at 13, *Pizzaro Reyes v. Raycraft*, No. 25-1982 (6th Cir.

Nov. 21, 2025). As such, continuing to maintain this position is § 1252(g) covers “all claims arising from deportation proceedings” or imposes “a general jurisdictional limitation.” *Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.*, 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). “A claim of unlawful detention does not arise from the commencement of removal proceedings ‘within the meaning of § 1252(g) simply because the claim[] relate[s] to that discretionary, prosecutorial decision.’” *Alonso v. Tindall*, 2025 WL 3083920, at *2 (W.D.

Ky. Nov. 4, 2025) (quoting *Ozturk v. Hyde*, 136 F.4th 382, 397 (2d Cir. 2025)). Here, Meza’s petition for habeas challenges his detention, not the removal or proceedings. [DE 1 at 16]. Meza seeks release from an unlawful detention, not any judgment on the removal itself. [Id.].

Because he challenges the statutory and constitutional validity of his continued detention, neither § 1252(b)(9) nor 1252(g) bars jurisdiction and review of Meza’s petition is appropriate. III. Exhaustion of Remedies Neither party asserted any exhaustion-related arguments and no applicable statute or rule mandates exhaustion.

However, because many decisions in similar cases by district court within the Sixth Circuit discuss this principal, the Court incorporates its analysis on exhaustion of remedies from a previous case, *Edahi*, 2025 WL 3466682, at *3, and the Court waives the exhaustion requirement for the same reasons. IV. DISCUSSION A. Section 1225 vs. Section 1226 The United States argues Section 1225 applies to Meza’s detention, not Section 1226.

1. The Statutory Language. The first statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 titled “Inspection by immigration officers;4 expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing” states, in pertinent part, (b) Inspection of applicants for admission (2) Inspection of other aliens (A) In general Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229(a) of this title.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). For purposes of this provision, “an alien who is an applicant for admission” is defined as an “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).

The second provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1226, titled “Apprehension and detention of aliens” states: (a) Arrest, detention, and release On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney General— (1) May continue to detain the arrested alien; and (2) May release the alien on— (A) Bond of at least \$1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General...

8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 4 Immigration Officers are defined as “any employee or class of employees of the Service or of the United States designated by the Attorney General, individually or by regulation, to perform the functions of an immigration officer specified by this chapter or any section of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(18). “Inspection” is not defined by statute but U.S. Customs and Border Patrol states, “[t]he inspection process includes all work performed in connection with the entry of aliens and United States citizens into the United States, including pre-inspection performed by the Immigration Inspectors outside the United States.” U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, Immigration Inspection Program, (Mar.

6, 2024) Under Section 1225(a)(1) “applicants for admission,” are noncitizens “present in the United States who [have] not been admitted.” Section 1225(a)(1). Under subsection (b), certain “applicants for admission” may be subject to removal proceedings. *Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigam*, 591 U.S. 103, 108-09 (2020). “Admission” and “admitted” are defined as “the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).

Section 1225, with limited exception, has a mandatory detention provision. Section 1225(b)(2)(“if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a...” (emphasis added). Noncitizens detained under Section 1225(b)(2) may be released only if they are paroled “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).

Section 1226 authorizes “the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 289. Section 1226(a) creates a discretionary framework for noncitizens arrested and detained upon an arrest “warrant issued by the Attorney General.” Section 1226(a).

The Attorney General “may continue to detain the arrested alien,” “may release the alien” on bond of at least \$1,500 or “may release the alien” on parole. *Id.* The arresting immigration officer makes an initial custody determination. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1).

However, noncitizens can appeal that determination in a bond hearing before an IJ. *Id.* Congress recently amended Section 1226(c). Through the Laken Riley Act, Congress added two new

mandatory provisions to the general discretionary framework of Section 1226. Now, as codified in Section 1226(c), the Attorney General must detain a noncitizen if (i) the noncitizen is inadmissible because they are in the United States without being admitted or paroled, obtained documents for admission through misrepresentation or fraud, or lacks valid documentation, or, “is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, or admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or any crime that results in death or serious bodily injury to another person.” Section 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)-(ii).

To summarize, if detained under Section 1225(b)(2)(A), the noncitizen must remain in custody for the duration of their removal proceedings, but if detained under Section 1226, the noncitizen is entitled to a bond hearing before an IJ. *Rodriguez v. Bostock*, 779 F. Supp.3d 1239, 1247 (W.D. Wash. 2025). Section 1225 essentially “supplement[s]” Section 1226. *Rodriguez Disa v. Garland*, 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir.

2022). 2. Statutory Application to Meza As an initial matter, the detention papers and arrest warrant both state that Meza was detained and arrested pursuant to Section 1226 as they were provided via Form I-200. [DE 16-1 at 79]. Arrest Warrants, Form I-200s, are only found within Section 1226 and its implementing regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 236. This statutory authority requires a bond hearing.

Regardless, the United States contends that Meza is not only an applicant for admission but is also “seeking admission” pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2)(A) and therefore is subject to the mandatory detention provision of Section 1225(b)(2)(A). [DE 7 at 48].

The question before the Court is whether “an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted” includes someone like Meza, who is not presently seeking admission but has been in the United States for more than twenty years without inspection.

In other words, the Court must decide whether Meza, who may be an “applicant for admission” and who was detained pursuant to a Form I-200 arrest warrant, is also “seeking admission” pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2)(A).

The United States contends he is. [DE 7 at 49]. If so, he would be placed in mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) and his habeas petition would be denied. [Id.] If not, then he has been “arrested and detained pending a decision on whether [he] is to be removed from the United States” pursuant to Section 1226(a). Petitioner contends that Section 1226 should control.

[DE 1 at 12-13]. He further contends that because Section 1226 controls, his Fifth Amendment due process rights have been violated and he should be entitled to the full due process under the law. [Id. at 6-8]; *Maldonado v. Baker*, 2025 WL 2968042, at *9-10 (D. Md. Oct. 21, 2025). When

interpreting statutes, “the inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.” *In re Vill.*

Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 947 (6th Cir. 2022) (internal quotes omitted). However, ambiguity is not determined by examining provisions in isolation. *Rodriguez v. Noem*, No. 1:25-CV-1196, 2025 WL 3022212, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025). “[T]he ‘meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.’” *Id.* (quoting *FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)). “The words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” *Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc.*, 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012).

This Court must also “use every tool at [its] disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.” *Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo*, 603 U.S. 369, 400 (2024). “It is ‘a cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that a ‘statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” *TRW Inc. v. Andrews*, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting *Duncan v. Walke*, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)). “[E]very clause and word... should have meaning.” *United States, ex rel.*

Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432 (2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This includes titles and section headings. See *Dubin v. United States*, 599 U.S. 110, 120-21 (2023). “[A] title is especially valuable [where] it reinforces what the text’s nouns and verbs independently suggest.” *Yates v. United States*, 574 U.S. 528, 552 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring)). i. The Title and Statutory Scheme.

Section 1225 is titled: “Inspection by immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” The added word of “arriving” supports the notion that the statute governs “arriving” noncitizens, not those present already. This is further reinforced by the text of the statute itself, which is focused on inspections for noncitizens when they arrive via “crewman” or as “stowaways.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B)(i)-(iii) (“who is a crewman... who is a stowaway.”).

This limited, and more specific methods of entry suggest that Section of 1225(b)(2) is limited to noncitizens arriving at a border or port, being inspected by an immigration officer, and are presently “seeking admission” into the United States. *Pizarro Reyes*, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (citing to *Dubin*, 599 U.S. at 118 (2023)).

As a result, Section 1225(b)(2) is more limited in scope than the United States asserts. *Id.* Further, Section 1225’s implementing regulation is found in 8 C.F.R. § 235, which is titled “Inspection of Persons Applying for Admission.” The language in the first part of the regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 235.1, states that “[a]pplication to lawfully enter the United States shall be made in person to an immigration officer at a U.S. port-of-entry when the port is open for inspection...” This language

also supports Section 1225 being about the inspection process on arrival at a port of entry for individuals presenting themselves for examination before an immigration officer.

The title is also divided into sections which are separated by semicolons. The first phrase is “inspection by immigration officer.” According to both parties, Meza entered the United States “without inspection,” [DE 7 at 48], and as a result, this portion of the title is inapplicable to Meza’s situation. Next, the part of the heading specifying “expedited removal” specifically includes the words “arriving aliens.” This portion of the title is also inapplicable to Meza as he is already in the country, has been for more than twenty years, and thus, is not arriving.

As such, the sections of this statute relevant to “expedited removal” are inapplicable to Meza. Instead, Meza was issued the Form I-862 upon arrest, which is the administrative document used to provide the written notice requested by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). [DE 16-1].

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a), the government must provide a “notice to appear” to start removal proceedings under section 1229a (also known as INA § 240 proceedings). Form I-862 is the physical form that fulfills this requirement. While DHS issues the form, legal proceedings under 1229 only officially commence when the I-862 is filed with the Immigration Court (“EOIR”).

Simply receiving the form does not mean a court case has started until that filing occurs. Here, Meza’s Form I-862 was filed and the proceedings commenced. [DE 7 at 41 (stating that Meza’s removal proceedings have been initiated)].⁶ Also notably, his Form I-862 has not been revoked or terminated by an order of the Immigration Judge, which would be necessary before issuance of a Form I-860 placing him in expedited removal proceedings.

For all these reasons, the text of the title indicates that § 1225 governs “arriving” noncitizens, while § 1226 focuses on the apprehension and detention of those noncitizens already in the country. The statutory scheme provides context, too.

In *Jennings*, the Supreme Court stated that Section 1226 is the “default rule” and “applies to aliens already present in the United States.”⁵ This is also consistent with his I-862 which does not check the box for “arriving alien,” but instead for “alien present in the United States who had not been admitted or paroled.” [DE 16-2 at 80].⁶ If an I-862 has already been filed with the court, the government must first terminate the immigration court’s jurisdiction through motion to terminate signed by the immigration judge.

8 C.F.R. § 1239.2; 8 C.F.R. § 239.2; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(m). Once this order is issued, the individual is no longer in “regular” removal proceedings and reverts to DHS custody for processing. See 8 C.F.R. § 1239.2; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(m). See *Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser*, 2025 WL 2637503, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (stating that “[t]he Government concedes that Ms. Salcedo Aceros is currently in full removal proceedings under Section 1229, and that while those proceedings are

live, she cannot be simultaneously subjected to Section 1225(b)(1)'s expedited removal proceedings"); see also, *Munoz Materano, v. Arteta*, 2025 WL 2630826, at *11 (S.D.N.Y.

Sep. 12, 2025) ("Respondents therefore expressly concede that, while Munoz Materano's appeal is pending, he remains in Section 240 removal proceedings subject to § 1229a, not expedited removal. *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 288; 301-03; see also, *Castañon-Nava v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.*, 161 F. 4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025) ("the difference in treatment between a noncitizen at the border and one already in the United States fits within the broader context of our immigration law.") The inclusion of a "default" right after a more limited and narrow statute is "likely no coincidence." *Pizarro Reyes*, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5.

It is "consonant with the core logic of our immigration system" that different statutory schemes would apply to non-citizens arriving at the border compared to non-citizens already within the country. *Martinez v. Hyde*, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 222 (D. Mass 2025).

The statutory scheme regarding the arrest warrant and the issuance of a notice to appear provides clarity, as well. Section 1226(a) states that "[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested" pending removal. Section 1226's implementing regulations further expand on this topic. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1 is titled "Apprehension, custody, and detention" and specifically § 236.1 is subtitled "Warrant of Arrest." It states that "[a]t the time of issuance of the notice to appear, or at any time thereafter and up to the time removal proceedings are completed, the respondent may be arrested and taken into custody under the authority of Form I-200, Warrant of Arrest." 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(b)(1).

As a result, Section 1226 focuses on individuals already in the United States who are found to be removable, and a Form I-200 administrative warrant is issued for their arrest. This is contrast to Section 1225 and its implementing regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 235.

Under Section 1225, noncitizens are not arrested pursuant to a warrant. They are detained upon arrival and are not permitted to enter the United States. This detention is a statutory function of the inspection process and not an arrest pursuant to administrative warrant. This again supports the overall notion that different statutory schemes would apply to different groups of non-citizens.

Martinez, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 222. Thus, Section 1225 is for arriving individuals "seeking admission" at the border and do not need to be arrested. Section 1226 is for noncitizens already present in the United States. *Castañon-Nava*, 161 F. 4th at 1061 ("[p]ut another way, 'U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2).

It also authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c)'" (alterations in original) (quoting *Jennings*, 583 U.S. at 289)).

Finally, the Laken Riley Act amendments to Section 1226 also support this distinction. “When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.” *Stone v. I.N.S.*, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995).

The Laken Riley Act added new mandatory detention provisions to an otherwise discretionary statute. Now, in Section 1226(c), the Attorney General must detain a noncitizen if (i) the noncitizen is inadmissible because they are in the United States without being admitted or paroled, obtained documents for admission through misrepresentation or fraud, or lacks valid documentation, or, “is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, or admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or any crime that results in death or serious bodily injury to another person.” Section 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)-(ii). If Section 1225(b)(2)(A) governed certain noncitizens as the United States claims it does, the Laken Riley Act would have been redundant and unnecessary.

That’s “because an alien present in the United States without admittance would be unlikely to prove that they are ‘clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,’ ICE would never need to rely on § 1226(c)(1)(E) to detain them.” *Pizzaro Reyes*, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (quoting Section 1225(b)(2)(A)). And further, “[courts] do not lightly assume Congress adopts two separate clauses in the same law to perform the same work.” *United States v. Taylor*, 596 U.S. 845, 857 (2022).

Reading the statutes otherwise would result in “two separate clauses” performing the “same work.” “Considering that § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) specifically refers to aliens ‘present in the United States without being admitted or paroled,’ and that § 1226(c)(1)(E) requires detention without bond of these individuals if they have also committed a felony, the recently created statutory exception would be redundant if § 1225(b)(2) authorized their detention as well.” *Pizarro Reyes*, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5.

In sum, based upon the titles, statutory context, relationship between Section 1225 and Section 1226, and most importantly the text, the Court finds it difficult to read a noncitizen who is “seeking admission” when the individual never attempted to “seek” admission pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2)(A). Notably, when the individual has been present in the country for approximately twenty-five years.

This is true, even if the noncitizen may be an “applicant for admission” pursuant to Section 1225(a)(1). That has no bearing on whether he is seeking admission under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). See, e.g., *Del Villar v. Noem*, 2025 WL 3231630, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 19, 2025) (stating that although the Petitioner may be “an applicant for admission” he is “not ‘seeking admission’ because he has been [present] in the United States.”) see also, *Alonso v. Tindall*, 2025 WL 3083920, at *5 (W.D.

Ky. Nov. 4, 2025) (holding that even though “Alonso is thus an ‘applicant for admission’ he is not ‘seeking admission’” and Section 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply). Recently, the Seventh Circuit, which is the first court of appeals to reach this issue, stated that the United States was “not likely to succeed on the merits of their argument” that Section 1225 governs the arrest of noncitizens already present in the United States.

See generally, *Castañon- Nava*, 161 F. 4th at 1061-62. The Seventh Circuit held that, “while a noncitizen arrested in the Midwest might qualify as ‘an alien present in the United States who had not been admitted,’ § 1225(a)(1), the mandatory detention provision upon which Defendants rely, limits its scope to an ‘applicant for admission’ who is ‘seeking admission,’ § 1225(b)(2)(A).” *Castañon-Nava*, 161 F. 4th at 1061. ii.

Plain Language of Section 1225. Section 1225(a)(1) states that an “applicant for admission” is “an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” Under § 1225(b)(2) any applicant for admission who is “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” must be detained. Respondents take the position that all unadmitted and uninspected aliens are “applicants for admission.” [DE 7 at 48-49].

Therefore, the United States asserts that “[i]t therefore follows that an ‘applicant for admission’ and a person ‘seeking admission’ are one and the same.” [Id.]. Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A), therefore, would call for mandatory detention of every noncitizen present in the United States who has not been lawfully admitted. This interpretation is much too broad.

See *Maldonado v. Olson*, No. 25-cv-3142, 2025 WL 2374411, at *12 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025) (“[A]ccepting Respondents’ one size-fits-all application of 1225(b)(2) to all aliens, with no distinctions, would violate fundamental canons of statutory construction.”); *Bautista v. Santacruz*, 2025 WL 3289861, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (“Respondents’ expansive interpretation of ‘applicants for admission’ would effectively nullify a portion of the INA through the DHS’s legislative or interpretive exercise of power.”) Respondents contend that because Meza is an “applicant for admission” who is seeking relief from his removal, he is “properly” detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

[DE 7 at 41]. But the United States interpretation of Section 1225 ignores or simply reads out the word “seeking” in the phrase “seeking admission.” Section 1225(b)(2)(A) states, “[s]ubject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title.” (emphasis added).

The term “seeking admission” is not defined in the statute. Seeking means “to go in search of” and is synonymous with “pursue.” Seeking, WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2024). Other

courts have stated that seeking “implies action.” *Lopez-Campos*, 2025 WL 2496379, at *6. And it is “Congress’s prerogative to define a term however it wishes, and it has chosen to limit the definition of an ‘applicant for admission’ to ‘an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.’” *Castañon-Nava*, 161 F. 4th at 1061 (quoting Section 1225(a)(1)).

Also, courts are instructed to presume that Congress would not add redundancy to statutes. *Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.*, 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995) (“the [Supreme] Court will avoid a reading which renders some words altogether redundant.”) And even if they did, Courts must give effect to every word in the statute. *Corley v. United States*, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009).

That is, courts must construe statutes as written even if “Congress could have expressed itself more clearly.” *Torres v. Lynch*, 578 U.S. 452, 472 (2016). Reading the statute as the United States contends would either ignore the plain meaning of “seeking” (which implies a present tense action, *Seeking*, WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2024)) or, more simply, readout “seeking” directly from the statute.

But this Court will not ignore words within a statute. This would be expressly against the “cardinal principal” of reading and interpreting every word in a statute. *Corley*, 556 U.S. at 314; *Castañon-Nava*, 161 F. 4th at 1061 (holding that “Defendants’ construction would render § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s use of the phrase ‘seeking admission’ superfluous” violating one of the cardinal rules of statutory construction”); *Villa v. Normand*, 2025 WL 3188406, at *7 (S.D.

Ga. Nov. 14, 2025) (stating that *Rojas v. Olson*, 2025 WL 3033967 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 2025) erred in its decision because, for one reason, they “gave little attention to the meaning of the term ‘seeking’”). And because “seeking admission” is not defined in the statute compared to other terms, such as “admission,” or “applicant for admission” it is this Courts’ duty to interpret every word in the statute.

Corley, 556 U.S. at 314; *Castañon-Nava*, 161 F. 4th at 1061 (stating that Congress “could easily have included noncitizens who are ‘seeking admission’ within the definition [of Applicant for Admission] but elected not to do so”); *Biden v. Texas*, 597 U.S. 785, 798 (2022) (“[i]f Congress had wanted the provision to have that effect, it could have said so in words far simpler than those that it wrote.”) This reading is further supported by the implementing regulations for Section 1225 set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 235, titled “Inspection of Persons Applying for Admission.” 8 C.F.R. § 235.1, subtitled “Scope of examination” specifically states that (a) General.

Application to lawfully enter the United States shall be made in person to an immigration officer at a U.S. port-of-entry when the port is open for inspection, or as otherwise designated in this section. (b) U.S. Citizens. A person claiming U.S. citizenship must establish that fact to the

examining officer's satisfaction and must present a U.S. passport or alternative documentation as required by 22 CFR part 53.

If such applicant for admission fails to satisfy the examining immigration officer that he or she is a U.S. citizen, he or she shall thereafter be inspected as an alien... ... (f) Alien applicants for admission. (1) Each alien seeking admission at a United States port-of-entry must present whatever documents are required and must establish to the satisfaction of the inspecting officer that the alien is not subject to removal under the immigration laws, Executive Orders, or Presidential Proclamations, and is entitled, under all of the applicable provisions of the immigration laws and this chapter, to enter the United States.

The regulations make clear that if any of the categories of individuals examined on arrival provide the appropriate documentations then they are either admitted and issued a "Form I-94 as evidence of the terms of admission," or "[a]ny alien paroled into the United States under section 212(d)(5) of the Act, including any alien crewmember, shall be issued a completely executed Form I-94, endorsed with the parole stamp." 8 C.F.R. § 235.1(h)(1)-(2).

If, however, the individual does not present the appropriate documents for examination, and therefore is not admitted or paroled, then they are subject to expedited removal. (2) An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled or an alien who seeks entry at other than an open, designated port-of-entry, except as otherwise permitted in this section, is subject to the provisions of section 212(a) of the Act and to removal under section 235(b) or 240 of the Act.

8 C.F.R. § 235.1(f)(2). Expedited Removal is set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 235.3, titled "Inadmissible aliens and expedited removal." This subsection specifically states that detention is appropriate prior to inspection on any vessel or aircraft that arrives in the United States and that expedited removal applies to any arriving alien and [a]s specifically designated by the Commissioner, aliens who arrive in, attempt to enter, or have entered the United States without having been admitted or paroled following inspection by an immigration officer at a designated port-of-entry, and who have not established to the satisfaction of the immigration officer that they have been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of determination of inadmissibility.

8 C.F.R. § 235.3(a)-(b)(emphasis added). As such, the regulation makes clear that detention and expedited removal under Section 1225 is for arriving aliens or those who have not been "physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of determination of inadmissibility." 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1)(ii). Meza does not fit within either category as there does not seem to be any question that he has been present in the United States for approximately twenty-five years. iii.

Plain Language of Section 1226 Section § 1226 as titled controls the “apprehension and detention of aliens.” Section 1226(a) permits a bond hearing if an “alien” who was “arrested and detained” on a “warrant issued by the Attorney General” is “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” The plain meaning of the statute is clearly applicable to Meza—an “alien,” who was arrested and detained by ICE, and is currently pending removal proceedings.

The Notice to Appear, issued by DHS, checked the box titled “You are an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled” rather than checking the box labeled “arriving alien.” [DE 16-1 at 80 (emphasis added)]. “This supports this Court’s conclusion, and reaffirms the Supreme Court’s determination in *Jennings v. Rodriguez*, that § 1226(a) applies to aliens already present in the United States, while § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to arriving aliens.

The Respondent’s new post hoc position is simply ‘impermissible.’” *Roman v. Olson*, No. CV 25-169-DLB-CJS, 2025 WL 3268403, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 24, 2025) (citation omitted) (quoting *Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.*, 591 U.S. 1, 22 (2020) (holding that “[t]he basic rule is clear: [a]n agency must defend its actions based on the reasons it gave when it acted,” not on “impermissible post hoc rationalizations.”)). iv.

Related Case Law The United States cites to several nonbinding district courts, and one BIA decision, to support their interpretation.⁷ However, the Court is not persuaded by these decisions for the reasons previously explained in *Edahi*, 2025 WL 3466682, at *9–13, incorporated here by reference.⁸ 7 None of cases cited by the United States are controlling authority within the Sixth Circuit.

Further, the BIA is neither binding, nor should be viewed as persuasive authority, on any district court. See *Loper Bright Enter.*, 603 U.S. at 413 (“courts... may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous”) (emphasis added). 8 Relatedly, the Central District of California granted Class Certification to a group of Petitioners in *Bautista v. Santacruz*, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D.

Cal. Nov. 25, 2025). There, the court certified “The Bond Eligible Class” defined as “All noncitizens in the United States without lawful status who (1) have entered or will enter the United States without inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the Department of Homeland Security makes an initial custody determination.” *Id.* at *9.

Courts have started to interpret and apply the Class Certification in different ways. See *Aranda v. Olson*, 2025 WL 3499061, at *8 n. 2 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 5, 2025) (stating that “it is unnecessary to address the impact of the [Class Certification] in ruling on the pending Petition); but see *Rodriguez v. Larose*, 2025 WL 3456475, at *5 n. 4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025 (holding that “[f]or the reasons discussed in this Order” in granting the writ of habeas corpus, “Petitioner is a member of

this class and entitled to the same relief.”) Originally, when the Central District of California granted Class Certification it refrained from entering a final judgment.

See *Bautista*, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9. Instead, the court set a status conference and ordered the parties to file a joint report on how to “proceed with [the] matter.” *Id.* Because of that, courts have found that the Class Certification does not “dictate [] [current] proceedings.” *Serrano v. McDonald*, 2025 WL 3296037, at *1 (D. Mass. Nov. 26, 2025). But on a motion for reconsideration, the Central District of California changed course.

Upon the motion, the court found “it appropriate to enter final judgment as to the claims encompassed within the MSJ Order.” *Bautista v. Santacruz*, 2025 WL 3713982, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). The court stated that entering a final judgement was appropriate because it would help aid in the “expeditious” manner of the case, and due to “new facts” that “indicate Respondents... noncompliance with the Court’s orders.” *Id.* Although noteworthy, it is still not necessary for this Court to adopt the position of the Central District of California.

For now, the Court “rests its decision” on the independent merits of Meza’s petition without relying on *Bautista*. *Santuario v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 3469577, at *2 n.4 (D. Minn. * * * For the reasons above, Meza, who has been present in the United States for approximately 25 years, is not “seeking admission” into the United States, a fact acknowledged in his notice for appearance by the checking of the box for “present” and not for “arriving,” as well as his arrest pursuant to the I-200 Warrant which authority arises out of Section 1226.

Section 1226, not Section 1225, applies to his detention. B. Lawfulness of Current Detention As stated, Meza is detained under Section 1226. The United States contends that because Meza is properly detained under Section 1225, not Section 1226, he has been afforded all the due process that is owed to him. [DE 7 at 61-62]. Otherwise, the United States does not respond to Meza’s alleged violation of due process.

Because the Court found that Meza’s detention is guided by Section 1226, the Court must determine whether the continued detention pursuant to Section 1226 is in violation of his Due Process. The Due Process Clause extends to all persons regardless of status. *A.A.R.P. v. Trump*, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025). This includes non-citizens. *Id.* To determine whether a civil detention violates a detainee’s due process rights, courts apply the three-part balancing test set forth in *Matthews v. Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

The Court must weigh: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the United States’ interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Id. at 335. The United States does not address the merits of his Due Process claim, but instead focuses solely on the legal argument of Section 1225 versus Section 1226 as referenced above. 1. Private Interest It is undisputed Meza has a significant private interest in not being detained. One of the “most elemental of liberty interests” is to be free from detention.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Courts can also consider the detainee’s condition of confinement. Martinez v. Noem, 2025 WL 2598379, at *2 (W.D.

Tex. Sep. 8, 2025). This is to determine if the conditions are indistinguishable from criminal incarceration. Id. Meza is being detained at Hopkins County Jail. [DE 1 at 5]. Meza has been married since 2007 and is a father to a fifteen year old U.S. Citizen. [Id. at 12]. But because of Meza’s detention in a separate state, he is currently separated from his family.

[Id.]. And he is the primary financial support for his family. [Id.]. Thus, the detention is imposing “significant financial, emotional, and other hardships to himself and his family.” [Id.]. As a result, the first Matthews factor favors Meza’s position. 2. Risk of Error The second factor concerns the risk of the erroneous deprivation of Meza’s liberty. A re- detention, without any individualized assessment, leads to a high risk of erroneous deprivation of an individual’s liberty interest.

Munoz Materano, 2025 WL 2630826, at *15 (holding that “re- detention without any individualized assessment” establishes a “high risk of erroneous deprivation” of a protected liberty interest). As of today, Meza has not had a merits bond hearing, with counsel and evidence. Munoz Materano, 2025 WL 2630826, at *15 (holding that Due process requires at a minimum the opportunity for the petitioner to submit evidence and be heard).

Respondents have not demonstrated that Meza is a flight risk or a danger to the community. It would appear to the Court the only change within the past year, with respect to Meza, is the United States’ novel interpretation of Section 1225 and Section 1226.

Thus, because of a high, if not already evident, risk of erroneous deprivation of Meza’s liberty interest, the second Matthews factor favors Meza. 3. United States’ Interest The final Matthews factor concerns the United States’ interest in the procedure, as well as any financial or administrative burdens associated with permissible alternatives. Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335.

The Court recognizes that the United States does have a strong interest in ensuring noncitizens do not harm their community and that they appear for future immigration proceedings. Sampiao, 2025 WL 2607924, at *12. However, a “routine bond hearing” before an IJ presently “minimal” burdens to the United States.” Hyppolite v. Noem, 2025 WL 2829511, at *15 (E.D.

N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025). These procedures are also already in place. *Id.* Therefore, “existing statutory and regulatory safeguards adequately serve the governmental interest in promoting public safety.” *Günaydin v. Trump*, 2025 WL 1459154, at *10 (D. Minn. May 21, 2025).

Because of that, the Court finds that the third Matthews factor also favors Meza. Therefore, the Court finds that all three Matthews factors favor Meza. The current detention of Meza is in violation of the Due Process Clause and the INA.

V. Remedy Numerous courts across the country have ordered the release of individuals stemming from ICE’s illegal detention. *Patel*, 2025 WL 2823607, at *6; *Beltran Barrera*, 2025 WL 2690565, at *7; *Roble v. Bondi*, 2025 WL 2443453, at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2025) (ordering petitioner’s “release from custody as a remedy for ICE’s illegal re-detention”).

The Supreme Court has also recognized that “Habeas has traditionally been a means to secure release from unlawful detention.” *Thuraissigiam*, 591 U.S. at 107 (emphasis in original). This Court is releasing Meza because of the “unlawful detention” by ICE and the United States for the reasons stated above. Meza is not being released because he is detained pursuant to Section 1226, as the United States contends.

But instead, the Court is ordering his release because of the United States’ illegal actions it undertook in Meza’s detention. *Hyppolite*, 2025 WL 2829511 *16 (holding that the United States cannot “detain [Petitioner] without first conducting a hearing before an IJ” because of the unlawful detention of Petitioner).

As a result of his release stemming from the “unlawful detention” in violation of his due process rights, and further pursuant to Section 1226 and its supporting regulations, Petitioner must be provided with a bond hearing on the merits before a neutral IJ prior to any redetention. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1).

The IJ may consider the non-exhaustive list of factors set out in *Matter of Guerra* 24 I. & N. 37, 40 (BIA 2006). Courts across the country have routinely held this procedure proper. *Alonso*, 2025 WL 3083920, at *9; *Lopez-Campos*, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9-10; *Mboup v. Field Office Director of N.J.*, 2025 WL 3062791, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 3, 2025); *Espinoza*, 2025 WL 2675785, at *11; *Ramirez Clavijo*, 2025 WL 2419263, at *6; *Munoz Materano*, 2025 WL 2630826, at *20.

Meza’s procedural due process rights are not violated by the very fact he is detained. “Rather, [Petitioner’s rights] are violated because he has been detained without a hearing that accords with due process.” *Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa*, 2025 WL 2691828, *12 (W.D. Tex. Sep. 22, 2025) (citing to *Black v. Decker*, 103 F.4th 133, 149-150 (2d Cir. 2024)).

Therefore, “the proper remedy” is the “full process due under [Section 1226] which includes a bond hearing before an [IJ].” *Maldonado*, 2025 WL 2968042, at *9-10; *Morales-Martinez v.*

Raycraft, 2025 WL 3124695, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 7, 2025) (holding that because Petitioner had been detained “without a... hearing, he is in federal custody in violation of federal law.”) Because Meza is being detained pursuant to Section 1226, relevant regulations entitle him to a neutral bond hearing.

See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1). Therefore, to afford Meza with the “full [due] process” under Section 1226, the United States must provide Meza with a neutral bond hearing before an IJ. Maldonado, 2025 WL 2968042, at *9-10. VI. Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the United States has violated Meza’s due process rights.

The Court GRANTS Meza’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [DE 1] and orders the following: I. The United States is directed to release Petitioner Meza because of the unlawful detention in violation of the INA and his due process rights. II.

The United States must provide him with a bond hearing before a neutral IJ pursuant to Section 1226. II. The United States must certify compliance with the Court’s order by a filing on the docket by January 15, 2026. United States District Court January 13, 2026 23