

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
FLORIDA, TAMPA DIVISION**

**Final Expense Direct v. Python Leads, LLC, Jacquelyn Leah Levin,
David Levin, and Ali Raza**

Final Expense Direct · No. 8:23-cv-2093-WFJ-AAS · Decided December 15, 2025

OPINION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION
FINAL EXPENSE DIRECT, Plaintiff, v. Case No. 8:23-cv-2093-WFJ-AAS PYTHON LEADS,
LLC, JACQUELYN LEAH LEVIN, DAVID LEVIN, and ALI RAZA, Defendants.
_____/ ORDER Before the Court is Defendant Ali Raza’s
 (“Raza”) Motion to Deem Requests for Admissions Admitted Against Defendant Python Leads,
LLC (the “Motion”), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(3).

Dkt. 176. Defendant Python Leads, LLC (“Python”) has responded in opposition, Dkt. 193, and
Defendant Raza has replied. Dkt. 194. Plaintiff Final Expense Direct (“Final Expense”) has also
responded, Dkt. 190, and Defendant Raza has replied. Dkt. 192.

After careful consideration, the Court grants Defendant Raza’s Motion to Deem Requests for
Admissions Admitted. Dkt. 176. BACKGROUND On July 23, 2025, Defendant Raza served
Defendant Python with Requests for Admissions (RFAs). Dkt. 176 at 5–8. 99 days after service of
the RFAs, on October 30, 2025, Defendant Raza filed the present Motion, requesting that the
Court deem all matters within his RFAs admitted.

Dkt. 176. 113 days after service of the RFAs, on November 13, 2025, Defendant Python filed its
Response in opposition to the Motion, which included responses to the RFAs. Dkt. 193 at 4–6.
DISCUSSION “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 expressly provides that requests for
admissions are automatically deemed admitted if not answered within 30 days, and that the
matters therein are ‘conclusively established’ unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or
amendment of the admissions.” United States v. 2204 Barbara Lane, 960 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir.

1992) (citation omitted); see Haas v. Fancher (In re Fancher), 802 F. App’x 538, 542 (11th Cir.
2020) (referencing the automatic effect of Rule 36(a)(3) to convert “requests into admissions”).
The untimely nature of Defendant Python’s responses is not in contention. See Dkt. 193 1–2.

Thus, the RFAs are deemed admitted by operation of law. Upon motion, the Court may permit the
withdrawal or amendment of an admission. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b) (stating that the withdrawal
or amendment of an admission may be permitted if “[1] the presentation of the merits of the action
will be subserved thereby and [2] the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court

that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice that party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits”); see also *Perez v. Miami-Dade Cnty.*

297 F.3d 1255, 1264 (11th Cir. 2002) (establishing a two-part test based on Rule 36(b) that must be applied in deciding motions to withdraw admissions). The Court declines to construe Defendant Python’s Response as a Rule 36(b) motion to withdraw or amend its admissions, as it does not appear to directly request a withdrawal or amendment; instead, Defendant Python provides minimal substantive argument as to why the Court should merely accept its untimely responses in lieu of its admissions.

See Dkt. 193 at 1–2 (showing two sentences of argument). Plaintiff seeks to avoid these admissions by Python. Plaintiff provides a robust analysis as to why Defendant Python’s admissions should be withdrawn, but the Court finds this argument to be inapt as Defendant Python’s admissions may only be utilized by Defendant Raza against Defendant Python—the admitting party—and not against Plaintiff.

See *Riberglass, Inc. v. Techni-Glass Indus., Inc.*, 811 F.2d 565, 567 (11th Cir. 1987); *First Acceptance Ins. Co., Inc. v. Ramirez*, No. 3:08-CV-1078- J-34JRK, 2010 WL 779315, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2010) (“The rights or liabilities of one party should not be beholden to the failure of another party, particularly an opposing party, to respond to requests for admissions.

Such deemed admissions may appropriately bind the defaulting party itself, but cannot justly be imposed upon a party that had no involvement in the failure to respond, and had no means to compel the defaulting party’s compliance. Finding otherwise would essentially allow the sins of one party to be visited upon another.”). Defendant Raza is thus preempted from utilizing these admissions in his opposition to Plaintiff’s pending Partial Motion for Summary Judgment.

See Dkt. 165. However, the Court finds this to be a non-issue, considering that Plaintiff does not seek summary judgment as to the sole claim against Defendant Raza. See Dkt. 203 at 1–2 (Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant Raza’s Response to the partial Motion for Summary Judgment, stating that Plaintiff “has not sought summary judgment against Defendant Ali Raza”).

Therefore, Defendant Raza’s Motion to Deem Requests for Admissions Admitted Against Defendant Python Leads, LLC, Dkt. 176, is GRANTED. DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on December 15, 2025. /s/ William F. Jung WILLIAM F. JUNG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE COPIES FURNISHED TO: Counsel of Record