

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Evans v. Individual Advocacy Group, Inc.

Evans · No. Civil Action No. 23-3925 (RC) · Decided May 7, 2026

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia denied Individual Advocacy Group, Inc.’s renewed Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Tarren Evans’s federal and District of Columbia False Claims Act retaliation claims. The court held that Evans plausibly alleged that the defendant had notice of her protected activity because she reported suspected backdating and compliance violations outside her usual chain of command and connected those concerns to federal funding. The court denied Evans’s Rule 56(d) discovery motion as moot.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the District of Columbia
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Rudolph Contreras
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the District of Columbia
DECIDED	May 7, 2026
DOCKET	Civil Action No. 23-3925 (RC)
DISPOSITION	denied
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Defendant moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleging retaliation under the federal and D.C. False Claims Acts. Plaintiff also moved for discovery under Rule 56(d).
STANDARD OF REVIEW	On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true, draws reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and determines whether the complaint states a facially plausible claim. Conclusory allegations and legal conclusions need not be accepted as true.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	published district court memorandum opinion

TOPICS

- whistleblower
- retaliation
- motions to dismiss
- federal spending
- employment law

PRACTICE AREAS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Evans plausibly alleged that IAG knew she was engaging in protected activity under the federal and D.C. False Claims Acts.
2. Whether Evans's complaints, including reports outside her ordinary chain of command and allegations connecting backdating to federal funding, overcame the presumption that she was merely performing her job duties.
3. Whether IAG's Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be granted and whether Evans's Rule 56(d) discovery motion should remain pending.

HOLDINGS

1. Evans plausibly alleged that IAG knew she was engaging in protected activity because she reported that backdating violated the conditions of federal funding and repeatedly escalated those concerns outside her usual chain of command.
2. The motion to dismiss the federal and D.C. False Claims Act retaliation claims was denied because the amended allegations plausibly stated claims.

KEY QUOTATIONS

“Drawing reasonable inferences from the facts alleged, the Court infers that the “concerns” regarding “faulty documentation practices” that Evans raised with Satcher in Human Resources were the same backdating and compliance concerns she had raised with Nyan previously.” (11-12)

“Assuming that is all true, IAG had notice of Evans’s protected activity.” (12)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Evans worked as a Clinical Nursing Director for IAG, a nonprofit that contracted with the D.C. Department of Disability Services to support adults with disabilities. She alleged that IAG managers instructed her to backdate training and patient documents submitted to DDS, creating inaccurate records connected to compliance and federal funding, and that she repeatedly objected. She reported the concerns to supervisors, Human Resources, a DDS nurse, and sought to escalate them to executive leadership; she was later placed on administrative leave and terminated.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Evans filed suit in December 2023 asserting federal False Claims Act retaliation, D.C. False Claims Act retaliation, and wrongful discharge. The court previously granted IAG's motion to dismiss but allowed Evans to amend. After Evans filed a Second Amended Complaint asserting only the two False Claims Act retaliation claims, IAG again moved to dismiss, and Evans sought Rule 56(d) discovery. The court denied the motion to dismiss and denied the discovery motion as moot.

DISPOSITION

denied

CASES CITED

- *Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham*, 798 F.3d 1119, 1125 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
- *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678-679, 681 (2009)
- *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)
- *Langeman v. Garland*, 88 F.4th 289, 292, 294 (D.C. Cir. 2023)
- *Hettinga v. United States*, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
- *Craig v. Not for Profit Hospital Corp.*, 626 F. Supp. 3d 87, 101-102 (D.D.C. 2022)
- *United States ex rel. Singletary v. Howard University*, 939 F.3d 287, 293, 299-301 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
- *United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard University*, 153 F.3d 731, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
- *United States ex rel. Williams v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co.*, 389 F.3d 1251, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
- *Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc.*, 341 F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2003)
- *United States ex rel. Schweizer v. Oce N.V.*, 677 F.3d 1228, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
- *Pitts v. Howard University*, 111 F. Supp. 3d 9, 19-20 (D.D.C. 2015)
- *SAI v. Department of Homeland Security*, 149 F. Supp. 3d 99, 110 (D.D.C. 2015)
- *Edelman v. Holder*, No. 08-cv-1767, 2010 WL 11668193, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2010)

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