

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA

Manuel Palomares v. City of Arvin, et al.

Palomares · No. 1:21-cv-01745 JLT CDB · Decided January 16, 2026

SUMMARY

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment in Manuel Palomares’s action against the City of Arvin and two police officers. The court rejected claims involving due process, equal protection, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and an implied Fourth Amendment unlawful-arrest claim. The court also dismissed the constitutional claims against the City because there was no underlying constitutional violation and directed entry of judgment for the remaining defendants.

CASE DETAILS

COURT	United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
WRITING FOR THE COURT	Jennifer L. Thurston
JURISDICTION	United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
DECIDED	January 16, 2026
DOCKET	1:21-cv-01745 JLT CDB
DISPOSITION	other
PROCEDURAL POSTURE	Defendants moved for summary judgment on Palomares's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act, as well as an implied Fourth Amendment unlawful-arrest claim. The court decided the fully briefed motion without a hearing.
STANDARD OF REVIEW	Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, draws justifiable inferences in that party's favor, and does not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations.
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE	unpublished, nonprecedential district-court order
PARTIES	Manuel Palomares v. City of Arvin, Aldo Ornelas, Armando Pantoja

TOPICS

summary judgment

section 1983

ada / disability

due process

equal protection

PRACTICE AREAS

Civil rights

Disability discrimination

Constitutional law

Municipal liability

Civil procedure

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the officers deprived Palomares of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest without procedural due process.
2. Whether the officers violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause by relying on Palomares's niece and friend to communicate with him rather than obtaining another interpreter.
3. Whether the City and officers violated the Americans with Disabilities Act or Rehabilitation Act by failing to communicate effectively with Palomares or by arresting him based on his wife's account.
4. Whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Palomares without a warrant for misdemeanor domestic-violence battery.
5. Whether the City could be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an allegedly unlawful policy or practice absent an underlying constitutional violation.

HOLDINGS

1. Palomares failed to identify evidence that the officers deprived him of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. Because he did not establish a protected interest, his procedural due process claim could not proceed, and summary judgment was proper.
2. The officers were entitled to summary judgment on Palomares's equal protection claim because, under the undisputed circumstances, relying on his niece and friend to communicate with him rather than obtaining another interpreter was rational.
3. The City was entitled to summary judgment on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims because Palomares identified no evidence that the officers communicated ineffectively, refused a requested interpreter, or acted because of his disability. The individual officers could not be sued under these claims.
4. The officers were entitled to summary judgment on the implied unlawful-arrest claim because the undisputed facts established probable cause to arrest Palomares for domestic-violence battery.
5. The City could not be liable under Monell for an allegedly unconstitutional policy or practice because the court found no underlying constitutional violation by the officers.

KEY QUOTATIONS

“The Court can grant summary judgment only if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”” (at 3)

“The motion for summary judgment (Doc. 38) is GRANTED. The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter judgment in favor of all remaining defendants and to close this case.” (at 11)

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Palomares, who is deaf and cannot speak, read, or write, communicated with Arvin police officers through his niece and a longtime friend rather than through a certified sign-language interpreter. The officers responded to a report that Palomares's wife had taken his communication tablet and, after speaking privately with his wife, learned her allegation that Palomares had pushed her against a wooden beam. Palomares denied the allegation, but the officers arrested him for suspected domestic-violence battery. The record showed that Palomares had access to a video interpretation service and that he never requested a different interpreter during the encounter.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Palomares filed the action in December 2021 concerning his arrest by Arvin police officers. The claims against Kern County were dismissed by stipulation in January 2024. The City and the two officers remained as defendants and moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, directed entry of judgment for the remaining defendants, and ordered the case closed.

DISPOSITION

other

CASES CITED

- Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians v. Harris, 682 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2012)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 252, 255 (1986)
- Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 324 (1986)
- Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 & n.7, 577 (1972)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998)
- Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)
- Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 755-68 & n.14 (2005)
- Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976)
- City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)
- Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001)
- Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 565 (9th Cir. 1988)
- Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999)
- Brown v. City of Los Angeles, 521 F.3d 1238, 1941 & n.3 (2008)
- Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations v. Glaser, 945 F.3d 1076, 1087 (9th Cir. 2019)
- American Timber & Trading Co. v. First National Bank of Oregon, 690 F.2d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 1982)

- United States v. Brobst, 558 F.3d 982, 997 (9th Cir. 2009)
- Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)
- Brye v. City of Stockton, No. 23-00343, 2025 WL 3089389, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2025)
- Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 471 (9th Cir. 2007)
- Edgerly v. City & County of San Francisco, 599 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2010)
- People v. Rocha, 3 Cal. 3d 893, 899 n.12 (1971)
- People v. Pinholster, 1 Cal. 4th 865, 961 (1992)
- People v. Williams, 49 Cal. 4th 405 (2010)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
- Lockett v. County of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020)

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